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The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was provoked by the US in response to 
the discovery of Operation Anadyr, the Soviet deployment of military equipment to Cuba. 
Operation Anadyr was intended to deter further US hostility against the Cuban government of 
Fidel Castro. For most of the history of US-Cuban relations, Cuba was either a US protectorate  
or client state, and under the Monroe Doctrine the US forbade Cuban cultivation of any  
European ally. In 1962, the US stationed nuclear missiles and conventional forces on Soviet 
borders; the US held unquestioned strategic superiority. The objectives of Operation Anadyr 
were to deter continued US attacks on Castro's Cuba and bolster the Soviet strategic deterrent, 
i.e., deter US hostile actions against the USSR. However, even if Operation Anadyr had not been 
discovered by the US, the impact of the deployed weapons on the balance of power and 
deterrence would have been minimal; the deployed weapons were not sufficiently numerous or 
capable of a disarming first strike. In contrast to the publicly held US position, the Soviet 
Operation Anadyr was neither an aggressive deployment intended to launch a first strike against 
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1952: Fulgencio Batista seized power through a coup, assuming dictatorial power in Cuba 
 
1958: US curtailed arms sales to Batista; Castro considered by the US Department of State not to 
be a communist agent. 
1959: US recognized Castro's government of Cuba on 6 January. Agreements signed between 
Turkey and Italy and the US to deploy US IRBMs in October. Assassination of Castro first 
contemplated by CIA in December. 
1960: Castro considered a Soviet client by US in March. In April, U-2 flights over Cuba began. 
In July, economic and political pressure initiated by the US against Cuba. 
1961: The US sponsored invasion of Cuba, the Bay of Pigs, fails in April. A follow-up 
campaign, Operation Mongoose, initiated in November. 
1962: Khrushchev develops the idea for Operation Anadyr in May. The Cuban Missile Crisis 














































































CIA: Central Intelligence Agency 
 
Counter-force: Weapons aimed at militarily significant enemy targets 
Counter-value: Weapons aimed at enemy population centers 
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
KGB: Committee for State Security (Soviet intelligence agency) 
MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction 
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OAS: Organization of American States 
PRC: People's Republic of China 
SAM: Surface to Air Missile 
 
SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
UN: United Nations 
US: United States of America 
 

























Cuba has been a point of political contention for the United States (US) in the realms of 
domestic and foreign policy for many years, even before the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The role of the island has evolved over time, as has its political affiliation. Cuba has been a 
Spanish colony, a US protectorate, and an independent nation over the last three hundred years. 
One important context in which the island is known in the US is as the setting for the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October 1962. In this incident, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) experienced military tension above the baseline of the Cold War (1945-1991) 
as a result of the US discovery of a Soviet operation, called Operation Anadyr, to deploy military 
hardware to Cuba. This hardware included nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of striking 
targets in the continental US. 
In the US, this deployment typically is presented as an act of Soviet aggression against 
the US. In the words of US participant Dino Brugioni: 
The Soviet Union had attempted, clandestinely, to move a massive nuclear strike force 
into Cuba, construct it rapidly, and seize a position of nuclear superiority that it could 
present as fait acompli. The missile, military, and naval bases established in Cuba were 
an extension of Soviet nuclear power and not relevant merely to the defense of Cuba; the 




The clandestine transport and construction of the Soviet strategic force was necessary 
because the US occupied a position of strategic superiority and could mobilize international 
institutions and allies in an effort to deter the USSR from the deployment. As an Imagry Analyst 











virtue of his position in the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the US held a definitive 
advantage regarding the balance of strategic forces, and the strategic forces of Operation Anadyr 
would not achieve nuclear superiority for the USSR. Whether or not the missile, military, and 
naval bases established in Cuba were an extension of Soviet nuclear power is irrelevant because 
the US had established a large number of bases in nations that bordered the USSR; if the Soviet 
bases in Cuba were an extension of nuclear power and not relevant to defensive purposes then 
the US bases bordering the USSR could also be viewed as extensions of US power and not 
relevant to the defense of those nations. The military benefits to the USSR were less important 
than the political benefits of deterring future US assault on Cuba, and the military deployment 
was considered necessary to deter such an attack. 
The characterization of Operation Anadyr as aggressive implies that the US did not act in 
an analogous manner. According to this view, the Soviet behavior would not have been intended 
for defense of an ally - Cuba - whom the US had repeatedly attacked; the USSR would have 
behaved illegally and the deployment would have created some strategic advantage for the  
USSR. Strategic weapons (e.g. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)) had political impact, 
while tactical weapons (e.g. Luna rockets) were limited to battlefield uses. Tactical weapons 
could be employed in a strategic context if an enemy were warned that tactical nuclear weapons 
could be used in the event of an attack and the nation was confident in its strategic position in the 
event of escalation to nuclear total war. 
Operation Anadyr sought to improve the general Soviet strategic position as well as 
defend Cuba from continued US military operations. The placement of strategic missiles would 
improve the Soviet nuclear deterrent, which would increase the safety of the USSR by expanding 





action. The placement also would provide a deterrent to further US attacks on Cuba because an 
attack on enemy strategic hardware could escalate to a full nuclear war. Even though the US was 
positioned advantageously for such a war, the cost to US civilians from a nuclear exchange 
deterred the US from exploitation of the strategic balance for political objectives. The USSR also 
was compelled to defend their only ally in the Western Hemisphere, who defied the Monroe 
Doctrine (i.e., the US policy that Central and South American nations could not be colonized or 
become client states of European powers) that had been promulgated by the United States since 
the Monroe Administration in the early nineteenth century. 
Another issue to consider was the evolving nature of deterrence at the time. When the US 
and USSR both possessed limited quantities of nuclear weapons, nuclear war was deterred by the 
fear that an enemy would destroy a civilian population center at the first warning of an attack. 
The USSR possessed a much smaller nuclear arsenal than the US by 1962 and fewer and less 
capable launch systems. The doctrine of finite deterrence, the idea that any number of nuclear 
weapons was sufficient to deter aggressive action, was being replaced in the US-USSR strategic 
balance by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD was the concept that 
both the US and USSR would be deterred from aggressive action if the enemy response to a first 
strike was sufficient to destroy half of the population and industrial capacity of the attacking 
nation.
2 
Finite deterrence and MAD had different requirements, both in terms of targeting and 
 
the deterrent force exerted by each type of arsenal. US strategic forces were equipped to adopt 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine Operation Anadyr both as a deterrent to further 
US military action against Cuba and a reinforcement of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. The first 
aim of this paper is to summarize the history of US-Cuban relations with a focus on 1957-1962. 
The second aim is to examine the balance of nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR as of 
1962. The third aim is to assess the strategic relevance of Operation Anadyr, and the fourth aim 
is to assess the strategic character of Operation Anadyr. The conditions required for an 
assessment of Operation Anadyr as an aggressive Soviet act will also be examined. 
More specifically, the first chapter will provide background of US-Cuban relations. From 
1823, US political leaders had considered the possibility that Cuba would be integrated into the 
US at some point. While Cuba never was granted statehood, it was a US protectorate between the 
end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the aftermath of the 1933 Cuban Revolution. 
However, even after Cuba was formally released from the status of protectorate, the US exerted 
an imperial influence over Cuban affairs. Immediately after the end of the Cuban Revolution in 
1959, the US attempted to re-establish influence over the Cuban government. 
The second chapter will examine the strategic balance between the US and USSR as of 
1962. In 1962, the US public perception was that the USSR held a substantial lead in the 
development of ICBMs and nuclear warhead design. This impression developed from the Soviet 
space accomplishments of the 1950s, particularly the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. Soviet First 
Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev's public boasting about the rate of Soviet 
missile production continued to fuel this perception. However, this public impression was 
incorrect; US President Dwight Eisenhower and the US government were well aware that the 
missile gap actually favored the US. John F. Kennedy utilized the perception of the "missile gap" 





informed that the 'missile gap' actually favored the US. This fact frequently is referenced in the 
context of the Soviet rationale for placing nuclear weaponry in Cuba. 
The third chapter will assess the impact of Operation Anadyr on the Cold War balance of 
power. The placement of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and Medium Range 
Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba was not as substantial an action as is typically presented. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) possessed nuclear superiority by a substantial 
margin over the Warsaw Pact (USSR and allied states), including US placement of IRBMs in 
Turkey. From a nuclear strategy perspective, significant missile deployments to client states both 
protected the host nations from military action by an enemy state and raised the target priority for 
enemy war planning. Deployment of strategically significant systems accomplished both military 
and political objectives. 
The fourth chapter will assess whether Operation Anadyr better fit the characterization of 
defensive rather than offensive action. Even if the Soviet missile installation had proceeded 
without US knowledge, those missiles would not have provided the USSR with nuclear parity,  
let alone superiority. The deployment of strategic missiles could defend Cuba from US action, 
because in the event of a US invasion of Cuba the missiles could be launched at targets in the 
US. Further, the placement of additional Soviet missiles strengthened the balance of MAD by 
narrowing the missile gap between the US and USSR. A power imbalance was destabilizing 
because the stronger power could attempt to exert influence that the weaker power would find 
difficult to counter. However the doctrine of finite deterrence was not discarded; the US was 
restrained by the impact of any type of nuclear war. Even if the US were 'victorious,' the risk to 





The final chapter will summarize how the Cuban Missile Crisis was an aggressive US 
action, with the objective of preventing the USSR from protecting their client state Cuba by the 
deployment of strategic equipment. The withdrawal of the US IRBM systems from Turkey, 
which was a strategically analogous deployment in terms of military value and political 
objective, can be interpreted as tacit acknowledgement that the US deployment to Turkey was 
equivalent to the Soviet deployment to Cuba and that the deployments should be strategically 









As might be expected from their geographical locations, Cuba and the US had an 
extended history. The strategic significance of Cuba evolved as technology and political relations 
with European powers developed but Cuba was appraised as a valuable territory from the early 
years of the nineteenth century. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the history of US-Cuban 
relations between 1823 and 1961, before the genesis of Operation Anadyr. 
Because of geographical proximity, Cuba had long been considered strategically valuable 
to the US. US President Thomas Jefferson opposed acquiring overseas colonies, drawing the line 
of expansion to those territories that could be defended without naval power in 1809, but felt that 
Cuba should be the geographic limit of US colonization.
1 
Jefferson's attitude had shifted by  
1823; in that year he "aspired only to keep it [Cuba] from falling into British hands, by 
supporting its independence,"
2 
rather than advocating the incorporation of Cuba into US  
territory. In the words of US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823, Cuba was "an 
object of transcendent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union."
3 
Cuba 
is positioned 90 miles from the coast of Florida
4 
and as a US territory would give the US an 
 
expanded military and commercial presence in the Caribbean Sea. In 1823 US President Monroe 
promulgated a strategic doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine, in which he warned "European monarchs 
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This doctrine became a fundamental plank of US foreign policy;
6 
the US did not 
demand that European nations forfeit American colonies but forbade the establishment of new 
colonies. In 1821 the North American Review anticipated US imperialism of South 
America: "South American will be to North America...we are strongly inclined to think, what 
Asia and Africa are to Europe."
7 
Cuba occupied a position of strategic and political importance 
in the US view, so much so that the US "made clear that it would not allow Cuba to fall into the 
hands of another power (other than itself or Spain)."
8 
In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams believed that it was “scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of 
Cuba…will be indispensible [sic] to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.”
9 
In the 
years leading up to the US Civil War, Spanish control of Cuba was unquestioned. However, in 
the 1854 Ostend Manifesto some US politicians called for the annexation of Cuba; if not for the 
outbreak of the Civil War, "this proslavery reading of Monroe's message might well have led to 
the annexation of the slave state of Cuba."
10 
Cuba had become a factor in both foreign and 
domestic political affairs. 
Cuba became a problem in both domestic and foreign political affairs in the years leading 
up to the US Civil War. A resolution introduced by Democratic Party Senator Lewis Cass in 
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any other power as an “unfriendly act.”
11 
While this had obvious implications for foreign policy, 
Cass at no point called for a vote, aiming instead to unite the party in fear of England despite the 
differences between Northern and Southern Democrats over the issue of slavery.
12 
The 
Democratic Party incorporated the Monroe Doctrine into their party platform, introducing a 
plank to that effect in 1856.
13 
Union victory in the US Civil War further isolated and pressured 
the remaining slaveholding states of the Caribbean, including Cuba.
14
 
In 1868 the US faced a dilemma: what to do in response to an uprising in Cuba by rebels 
who sought “the abolition of slavery, if not the construction of a new racial order.”
15 
Racial 
attitudes of the US also influenced political decisions: “the (US) Secretary of State recoiled at the 
prospect of annexing an island (Cuba) populated by what he viewed as racial inferiors.”
16 
The 
Spanish responded with force to the rebellion; Spain relocated “almost the entire rural population 
of the island into coastal cities, where it was confined in concentration camps.”
17 
Cuba was 
considered a priceless strategic asset relating to control of the Gulf of Mexico,
18 
and the outrage 
caused by the Spanish conduct required to suppress the rebellion provided the reason for the US 
to develop war plans. Although this tension was insufficient to support a declaration of war 
against Spain, it was sufficient to cause the deployment of the USS Maine to Cuba as an 
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On 15 February 1898, the US battleship USS Maine exploded and sank in Havana 
harbor.
19 
A US court of inquiry determined the cause to be a submerged mine, and was “unable 
to fix responsibility for the placing of the mine.”
20 
The court was unable to determine who was 
responsible for the placement of explosives. After this result was made public, the US position 
concerning Cuba was that “Spain must accept responsibility for the loss of the Maine, make 
reparations to the United States, and [italics original] grant Cuba independence. Otherwise 
President McKinley would not be able to resist the popular demand for war.”
21
 
After US negotiations with the Spanish government, the Spanish refused the US 
demands. The US declared war on Spain on 22 April 1898, and launched a blockade of Havana 
harbor.
22 
Public enthusiasm for war was such that after US President McKinley called for 
125,000 volunteers for military service,
23 
one million men sought enlistment.
24 
In May 1898 the 
 
US offered peace to Spain on terms including the forfeiture of Cuba and Puerto Rico to US 
control,
25 
but Spain again refused to surrender. On 14 June 1898 American forces captured 
Guantanamo Bay, which would be an American war prize.
26 
US forces successfully conquered 
Cuba, and on 17 July Spanish forces in Cuba surrendered.
27 
The peace articles stipulated that 
Spain was to relinquish sovereignty over Cuba, the US was to assume responsibility for 
protection of life and property for the length of occupation, and that the US was to assume all 
financial obligations for the length of occupation.
28 
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stipulated that “the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island (Cuba).”
29 
The US role was limited to a 
caretaker authority until such time as Cuba formed an independent government. Cuba was not 
incorporated into the US as a state; before US forces would be withdrawn Cuba was required to: 
Incorporate into its constitution the so-called Platt amendment. The amendment forced 
Cuba to recognize the right of the US to intervene to protect Cuban independence, 
maintain a stable government, or protect life and property; it restricted the right of Cuba 
to enter into a treaty with any foreign government without American approval; and it 





Under the terms of the Platt amendment, enshrined in the Cuban constitution by US 
demand, Cuba did not have any of the freedoms of an independent nation. Foreign relations were 
entirely controlled by the US; US military forces were stationed in Cuba and free to use Cuban 
facilities; the US was empowered to interfere with internal Cuban affairs if it so desired; and 
because economic relations were a subset of foreign relations, the Cuban government had no 
economic independence.
31 
Cuba remained a US client state until 1934.
32
 
In response to Cuban domestic political unrest in 1933, the US supported the coalition of 
Fulgencio Batista against the revolutionary Provisional Government.
33 
Those political leaders 
expected that "they could control a poorly-educated mulatto with little political experience 
[Batista]."
34 
As a sergeant in the pre-revolution Cuban military, Batista had neither the formal 
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economic policies that benefited Cuban workers at the expense of the sugar industry, Batista was 
able to appeal to populist sentiment. However, mounting domestic and US political pressure 
forced Batista to secure his position before elections to form a permanent Cuban government.
35 
Batista formed an alliance with the Cuban Communist Party, motivated on Batista's part by the 
need to become a civilian leader and on the Communist's part by a desire to resist fascism, which 
had already taken Spain.
36 
Batista announced that he would run for president and promised to 
resign his position as Army Commander on 6 December 1939.
37 
This positioned him to  
transition from military to civilian political leadership. Batista was elected president of Cuba; 
Cuban elections "gave the USA its long sought objective of a stable and quiet Cuba."
38 
However, 
Batista would not be content to serve as a president electorally responsible to the Cuban 
population. 
 
Batista served as elected president for the term 1940-1944, losing the 1944 election to 
Ramon Grau San Martin,
39 
but continued to rule from the background and seized power in a  
coup in 1952.
40 
Batista ruled by force, including the suspension of civil liberties to prevent the 
mobilization of peaceful political opposition.
41 
The central figure of resistance was Fidel Castro, 
who led a small band in resistance to Batista's rule but avoided battle with government forces, 
which possessed heavier weaponry.
42 
Castro's band, the 26th July Movement, burned sugar crops 





Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 448. 
36 
Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 451. 
37 
Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 456. 
38 
Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 457. 
39 
Louis A. Pérez, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy. University of Georgia Press, 2003, 206. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46ng92 
40 
D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," The World Today 14, No. 4 (Apr., 1958): 162. 
41 
D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," 163. 
42 





Batista; "it says much for the unpopularity of the Government that the public who are the chief 
sufferers from this campaign appear to support the rebels in ever-increasing numbers."
43 
The 
idea that the man ordering the bombing of civil buildings and burning crops would be seen as a 
savior to the country speaks volumes about the opinion of Batista held by the Cuban people. 
Batista believed that the US possessed the capability to select the Cuban government, but 
US support for Batista's regime was due more to the US ambassador’s anti-Castro sentiments 
than to direct US support of Batista's rule.
44 
Complaints came from some members of the US 
Congress and neighboring nations that military equipment sold to Cuba for defensive purposes 
was utilized to suppress domestic rebellion; the US severed the supply of arms to Batista's 
government on 14 March 1958, thereby equalizing military supply chains between the Cuban 
government and the rebels.
45 
The Cuban government attempted to use the Cold War in an  
attempt to elicit US assistance, enabling more effective resistance to the 26th July Movement by 
charging that Castro was a member of the Communist Party.
46 
In April 1958, the US Department 
of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that “the evidence available to the 
Department does not confirm the Cuban government's charge that Castro is a communist."
47
 




However, whether Castro was a communist at the time of his ascent to power, the CIA judged 
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Batista resigned on 31 December 1958, creating a power vacuum that soon would be 
filled by Castro.
50 
Castro gained control of Havana two days after Batista fled the country, 
ending the 1953-1959 Cuban Revolution.
51
 
The US had foreseen Castro's victory, or at least Batista's defeat, for some time. For the 
six months before the end of the 1958 Cuban Revolution, Castro (and not Batista) had been "the 
principal recipient of U.S. arms."
52 
Arms sales are one of the most frequently used methods of 
signaling approval of a client government or rebel group in another nation, even more so when 
the weapons are not sold but freely given in return for influence. However, US policy toward 
Cuba shifted dramatically after January 1959. 
The US was the first nation to recognize Castro's government, on 6 January 1959.
53 
Initially, the US government held a positive impression of Castro, hoping for "a Cuban 
government that would combine necessary political reform with respectful attention to long- 
standing diplomatic and economic ties to the United States."
54 
The necessary political reform 
constituted the transformation from dictatorship to a democratic system, and the respectful 
attention to the relationship with the US implied that Cuba was a pliable US client, more like a 
protectorate than an independent nation. In Castro's first weeks in power he assured the world 
that he would reform the Cuban political system, but combined these assurances with 
"denunciations of the collaboration of the U.S. military with the fallen dictator [Batista]."
55 
Even 
as the political reform appeased the first tenet of the US government wish list, the accusations 
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that the US government had aided and abetted Batista's government would not be received in the 
same way. 
The US Ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsal, believed that "the Cuban government must 
recognize that it needed the aid and support of the United States,"
56 
and so must comport itself in 
ways meeting US approval. As indicated by Castro's accusations that the US had assisted his 
enemy during the revolution, it is doubtful that Castro perceived his relationship to the US in the 
same light. While the US had acted to assist Castro in some regards, e.g. curtailing arms sales to 
Batista's government, Castro would have considered the US an enemy rather than an ally. 
Ideologically, the world had been divided into three realms: The 'First World' consisting 
of the US, its affiliates, and its allies; The 'Second World' consisting of the USSR, its affiliates, 
and its allies; and the 'Third World' consisting of all unaffiliated nations. Cuba under Batista had 
been a member of the First World, and it was a US goal that Cuba resumed that political 
affiliation. Ambassador Bonsal believed that Castro was not a communist or communist agent, 




not announced any political affiliation, and at this point was treated as a potential client rather 
than a hostile actor. 
In late March 1959, the CIA reported to US President Eisenhower that "the Castro regime 
was moving more and more towards an outright dictatorship."
58 
Because of that assessment, 
President Eisenhower refused to meet with Castro when Castro visited the US at the behest of the 
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The US government had assessed the unreliability of Castro's rule; "Unless 
he [Castro] gets a strong helping hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his 
regime will collapse within a matter of months."
60
 
In contrast to the expected request for financial aid to Cuba that could purchase US 
influence over domestic Cuban political considerations, Castro did not request any aid.
61 
The US 
had no opportunity to purchase political or ideological concessions, because Castro did not 
position himself as a supplicant to US economic or military power. Ambassador Bonsal believed 
that "Castro must be persuaded that the best hope for Cuba lay in renewed alliance with the 
American security system."
62 
This alliance would take form for Cuba in both political and 
economic policy considerations. However, the economic relationship between the two nations 
soon would be stressed by Cuban economic policy. 
In May 1959, Cuba passed an Agrarian Reform Law that was seen by the US "as little 
more than a cover for confiscation."
63 
The Cuban government was empowered to "expropriate 
private property within its jurisdiction for public purposes," provided that it offered "prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation."
64 
However, the Cuban government neither offered any 
payment nor ceased to expropriate foreign property outside the scope of the Agrarian Reform 
Law.
65 
Castro's contemptuous opinion of the OAS, which was seen by the US as "an instrument 
for preserving U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere,"
66 
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The Eisenhower administration attempted to use the Organization of American States 
(OAS) conference in Santiago, Chile on August 1959 to establish "an expanded version of the 
Monroe Doctrine,"
67 
thus cloaking US regional policy in the guise of international law. The US 
claimed in a statement delivered in October that it had attempted to "prevent illegal acts by its 
[US] residents" and prohibited arms sales to Castro's government as part of a general ban on 
arms sales to the Caribbean region.
68 
Further, the US "earnestly hoped that the government of 
Cuba would carefully review its policy and attitude toward the United States,"
69 
and once again 
submit to US pressure. The US anticipated that Castro would come in line with US wishes, 
alternately bribed and coerced by military and economic pressures. President Eisenhower did not 
understand why Castro did not relish the status of client, and "gradually came to the conclusion 
that CIA reports of increasing communist influence must be correct."
70 
From the US perspective, 
the only reason why a nation could refuse the status of US protectorate was because that nation 
had become the protectorate of another power, and the only other superpower patron was the 
USSR. US policy makers had not yet concluded that Castro was a communist client, but agreed 
that "the spread of Castroism would endanger U.S. influence and effective economic 
development in Latin America."
71 
Whether Castro was a Soviet client at this point was  
irrelevant: Castro's example made him an enemy of US regional policy. 
Assassination of Fidel Castro by US agents had been proposed as early as December 
1959, with the coordination of Mafia leadership.
72 
It is noteworthy that the US government 
cooperated with a known criminal organization in the name of achieving foreign policy 
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objectives. On 11 December 1959, the CIA proposed a program with the objective to "overthrow 
of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will 
call for elections 6 months after assumption of office."
73  
The CIA had begun to gather recruits 
from the Cuban exile community in the US for a covert operations force to be used against 
Castro's government.
74 
By 8 January 1960, the CIA had begun a series of covert anti-Castro 
programs.
75 
On 13 January 1960 a group was tasked with the assassination of Fidel Castro;
76 
given these activities, Castro was right to anticipate overt and covert US action against Cuba and 
against him personally. 
 
The US publicized a policy statement on 26 January 1960 stating a nonintervention 
pledge; claiming that the US and not Cuba was "preventing the use of its territory for illegal 
acts;" expressing concern about Castro's accusations against the OAS and US; claiming to 
recognize "the right of the Cuban government and people to undertake social, economic, and 
political reforms;" expressing hope for diplomatic negotiations; and stating concern about the 




statement can be condensed to wishes that the Cuban government once more act as a pliable 
client to US interests. Castro's reception to this statement was skepticism; both US diplomatic 
efforts and the intermediary effort of the Argentinean ambassador "were judged propaganda 
ploys designed to conceal America's true intentions"
78 
by Castro. Castro evidently judged that 
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Eisenhower planned to ask Congress to declare war on Cuba if the island fell under the Soviet 
Union's control."
79 
The Monroe Doctrine was valued above the UN Charter in the eyes of US 
policymakers during the Cold War. 
Castro responded to the US offer by inviting Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan to 
Cuba in February 1960 through the intermediary of KGB (Soviet intelligence agency, Committee 
for State Security) agent Aleksandr Shitov.
80 
Because Castro was suspicious of US motives and 
plans, it would have been logical to pursue an alliance with the only other global entity capable  
of deterring the US from hostile action. Mikoyan obliged, and during the trip Mikoyan and  
Castro spoke of economic relations. Mikoyan extended the Soviet offer of 100 million dollars   
US as an economic credit,
81 
and an agreement was made that Soviet technicians and engineers 




This referred only to civilian technology, e.g. construction equipment, because US-Cuban 
relations had not yet decayed to the point where the Cuban government feared US invasion.
83 
However the artificially friendly status of US-Cuban relations could be due to US fears of 
regional repercussions to US action against Cuba;
84 
"in March 1960, U.S. Cuban policy took a 
distinct turn."
85 
At this point the US deemed Cuba an enemy state instead of a potential client. 
The US perceived Mikoyan's visit to Cuba as the point at which the US goal of the 
overthrow of Castro's government became inevitable.
86 
On 17 March 1960 the US government 
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"the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban 
people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. 
intervention."
87 
At this point the US desired the overthrow of Castro's government and its 
replacement by a pliable client group that would not adopt anything but a pro-US position on all 
issues. Enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine was sought with the preservation of plausible 
deniability; one of the goals listed in the CIA policy paper of 17 March was that "Sino-Soviet 
influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated."
88 
This policy reflects the US determination 
that Castro had become a Soviet agent, and that "Castro was the self-declared enemy of 
hemispheric security and the United States."
89 
The US operated under the assumption that it 
alone was the arbiter of hemispheric security, and any action or policy not approved by the US 
was a threat to US national security. 
In April 1960, the US military approved a CIA request to conduct U-2 surveillance  
flights over Cuba.
90  
The operational altitude of the U-2 protected it from Cuban interception 
efforts at this time. This information was required to plan military operations against Cuba, along 
with information about the Cuban armed forces. These missions were regularly conducted until 
the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, despite their flagrantly illegal nature. This also was  
the mechanism by which the US discovered the Soviet deployment of strategic nuclear missiles 
on 14 October 1962.
91 
US disregard for the laws governing international relations and territorial 
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Eisenhower's Cuba policy contributed to the depth of relations between the USSR and 
Cuba; because only the USSR was positioned to fill the role of economic and political patron of 
Cuba should the US cede that ground. "On 6 July Eisenhower ordered a 700,000 ton cut in  
Cuba's 1960 sugar quota of 3,120,000 tons."
92 
This was the beginning of US economic action 
against Cuba, designed to pressure Castro to bow to US wishes. The decision to cut the sugar 
quota had been made in March 1960, along with the decision by Eisenhower to begin training 
Cuban exiles for anti-Cuban operations.
93 
The Cuban government denounced the US action to 
unilaterally reduce the import quota for Cuban sugar to the UN "as an example of economic 
warfare and illegal interference in Cuban affairs."
94 
As an isolated incident this reduction 
probably would not have been significant. In combination with the political pressure and military 
threat exerted by the US, Cuban accusations of economic warfare were not unfounded. 
Whereas the Cuban economy was much smaller than that of the US, the Cuban response 
was to negotiate with the USSR for the USSR "to increase their sugar imports to equal the 
American cut."
95 
Because the main Cuban export was sugar, this Soviet action was received 
positively by all Cubans, including Castro's enemies.
96 
In this way, the Cuban government 
 
secured a replacement market and strengthened political and economic ties with the other 
superpower and a potential Cuban patron. In August and September, the Cuban government 
nationalized US business in "manufacturing, commerce, finance, and transportation," therefore 
greatly reducing the US-held share of Cuban property.
97 
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directly compete with the US economy, by nationalizing US property in Cuba the Cuban 
government secured for itself a windfall with limited economic or political cost. 
The US economic response was to cancel agriculture and civil aviation technical 
assistance programs to Cuba, instruct US owned oil refineries in Cuba to refuse processing of 
imported Soviet oil, and freeze the US assets of Cuban citizens.
98 
However this economic action 
backfired in the same manner as the sugar quota reduction; the USSR responded by increasing 
their oil exports to Cuba,
99 
and the Cuban government nationalized US refineries in Cuba.
100 
The 
direct result of US economic action was for the USSR to move into the demand vacancies and 
reinforce Castro's domestic political position. An unanticipated consequence was that Cuba 
would now become a Soviet client state, and the economic actions "destroyed the possibility of 
reconciliation between Cuba and the United States."
101
 
The US viewed the Cold War political environment as if the US belonged in the position 
of unquestioned global superiority. Soviet First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita 
Khrushchev gave a speech on 9 July 1960 enveloping Cuba under the Soviet strategic umbrella: 
"Figuratively speaking, in case of need, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with 
their rocket fire if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against 
Cuba."
102 
This further reinforced US policymakers' views that Castro's Cuba was now a Second 
 
World nation, rather than either a US ally or an unaffiliated nation. The US claimed it would not 
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by international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."
103 
However the UN Charter, of which 
both Cuba and the US were members as of 24 October 1945, 
104 
states one purpose of the UN as 
"the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."
105 
The claim that the US 
would interfere in the domestic political affairs of another UN member state violated the UN 
Charter. This did not stop US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge from asserting that the Monroe 
Doctrine was "fully alive and will be vigorously defended by the United States,"
106 
legality and 
international obligations notwithstanding. 
American behavior referencing the OAS was similarly aggressive. The OAS Charter 
states that each member state is to be free to select domestic political, economic, and social 
systems in the way it chooses, without external interference.
107 
This external interference could 
take the form of foreign economic pressure (e.g., that exerted on Cuba by the US in 1959-1960), 
political pressure (e.g., the US effort to isolate and subjugate Cuba), or military pressure (e.g., 
that exerted by CIA trained Cuban exile groups). All of these actions directly violated the UN 
and OAS charters, as well as the fact that "in several OAS resolutions between 1946 and 1958, 
the United States had explicitly agreed that interference by one American state in the domestic 
affairs of another was forbidden."
108 
The US did not act as if it were bound by those promises. 
In July 1960, the US began the process of screening Cuban exile pilot recruits and 
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operation that would become the Bay of Pigs landing.
109 
This was problematic, because the  
scope of the operation had expanded and those assets were not sufficient to address the revised 
objectives. By June 1960, "the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped 
from some 60 to 500 or more trainees - even though the actual training of the initial instructor 
cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun."
110 
The program of training Cuban exiles  
to act as US agents against Castro's government had begun in a disorganized manner; the exiles' 
cause was not assisted by the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion that "no strong 
opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged."
111 
However institutional inertia had begun 
to gather around this effort to utilize the Cuban exiles as a tool to remove a political enemy; if  
the operation were to be cancelled, the CIA feared that the Cuban exile community would then 
accuse the US government of fearing to attempt to oust Castro, resulting in a loss of respect for 
the US among Central and South American states.
112
 
The US attempted to assassinate Castro on numerous occasions with the help of the US 
Mafia. In August 1960, CIA officials proposed that the assassination be conducted using the 
services of assassins "handpicked by the American underworld, specifically syndicate interests 
who have been driven out of their Havana gambling casinos by the Castro regime."
113 
This 
would preserve the plausible deniability of the Kennedy administration, further conceal the role 
of the US government, and enlist an unconventional ally against a common enemy. The CIA 
considered that these efforts "were viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely 
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The effort to remove Castro from office was ambivalent regarding the method of his 
removal, stipulating only that he be removed along with whichever associates who could 
successfully retain power and continue the existence of a Soviet allied Cuban state. 
In autumn 1960, the operational plan for the Bay of Pigs mission changed from the 
insertion of a small number of guerilla operatives with the objective of bolstering existing rebel 
forces to the insertion of a military force designed to oust Castro independent of any existing 
rebel forces.
115 
This force would now consist of a landing force of at least 1500 men, with the 
objective of seizing an advance position by combined sea and air attack.
116 
The strategic idea for 
 
this operation was the same that the CIA had used against Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenez in 
the 1954 CIA sponsored coup; this idea presumed that the Cuban people were rebellious against 
Castro's rule and that "Castro would lose his nerve."
117 
However Castro, as well as the US, 
possessed knowledge of this Guatemalan operation, and Castro expected some form of US 
action.
118 
Cuban intelligence services had penetrated the Bay of Pigs landing operation, and 




Cuban political isolation was extended after the Seventh Consultative meeting of the 
Ministers of the OAS. At that meeting a Cuban proposal to condemn the aggressive action of one 
American state (US) against another (Cuba) was voted against by 19 governments, and Cuba 
withdrew from the meeting.
120 
The US assumption that international bodies, e.g. the OAS,  
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The US began supply missions to Cuban resistance groups on 28 September, with the first 
mission resulting in the supplies delivered to Castro's forces, the death of the US agent on the 
ground, and the aircraft used being impounded in Mexico after navigational error.
121 
This was 
not a promising hallmark for the military phase of anti-Castro operations, but military operations 
were the recourse chosen when "efforts to isolate Cuba internationally and to cripple it through 
trade sanctions seemed unpromising."
122 
The US had defined Cuba as an enemy ideological 
outpost and the incoming Kennedy administration had campaigned vigorously in favor of action 




On 7 October, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa publicly revealed details about the Bay 
of Pigs operation, basing his announcement on intelligence gathered by Cuban agents.
124 
On that 
same day, candidate Kennedy publicly attacked the Eisenhower administration for "permitting a 
communist menace ... to arise only ninety miles from the shores of the United States."
125 
Kennedy expanded his attacks in the next two weeks, stating that Cuban revolutionaries against 
Castro had "virtually no support from our government."
126 
Kennedy's political rival and 
campaign opponent Richard Nixon, who as Eisenhower's Vice President was very well informed 
of both current and planned anti-Castro operations, characterized Kennedy's position on Cuba as 
"irresponsible and reckless."
127 
Domestic political tension was beginning to have an effect on 
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as a client state he and his party would attract criticism. Kennedy was locked by his political 
promises into immediate action rather than a calculated strategy. 
Guatemalan agents of Cuban intelligence delivered to Cuba records of the growing force 
of exiles, the aircraft with which they were training, and the basing locations on 13 November.
128 
Five days later, CIA leadership told President-elect Kennedy about the operational plan.
129   
Castro knew about the Bay of Pigs operation before Kennedy did, and Kennedy was the man 
who would order the plan's execution. The change in US political leadership also hindered 
operational planning, because "the hallmarks of the new [Kennedy] administration were ad hoc, 
informal decision processes and impatience with matters of organization."
130 
These hallmarks 
would deny the Kennedy administration the rigorous debate incorporated in the planning process 
for most military operations. At the time of Kennedy's inauguration, rather than sponsor his own 
plan of anti-Cuban action he was faced with the decision to proceed with a plan that had been 
developed and was being actively promoted by the CIA.
131
 
In January 1961, operational preparation accelerated and US-Cuban tension climbed. On 
1 January the US accelerated recruitment for its Cuban exile force, and on 3 January the Cuban 
government announced that "the total number of personnel at the U.S. Embassy and Consulate 
should not exceed eleven persons."
132 
In response to this Cuban demand, the US announced a 
break in relations and demanded the recall of all Cuban nationals stationed in the Cuban embassy 
in Washington DC.
133 
Still on 3 January, Castro announced a future declaration to the UN: "if the 
United States believes it has the right to promote counterrevolution in Cuba, and believes it has 
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the right to promote counterrevolution in Latin America, then Cuba has the right to encourage 
revolution in Latin America!
134 
The US had a greater opportunity for political defeat than did the 
Cuban government at this point. A failed US attempt to overthrow the Cuban government would 
have greatly reduced influence in Central and South America and demonstrated aggressive intent 
in the international political arena. 
CIA officials prepared a memorandum to conceptualize the invasion plan in which it was 
stated that the landing force would execute "no early attempt to break out of the lodgment for 
further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime 
or overt military intervention by US military forces has taken place."
135 
The fact that the Cuban 
military numbered at least 200,000 men
136 
and was capable of repelling a landing force of 1500 
 
without active support from US military forces is not addressed in the sources. On 6 January, the 
US State Department "says it doubts that Castro is planning to let the Soviet Union establish 
missile bases in Cuba."
137 
Soviet missile facilities in Cuba would transform Cuba from an allied 
state into a Soviet strategic outpost, incorporating Cuba into the Soviet strategic apparatus to 
deter US attack. 
In mid-January, the US imposed a travel embargo on Cuba, prohibiting US citizens from 
travelling directly between US territory and Cuba.
138 
The US had economically and politically 
isolated Cuba and now had barred any travel between the two nations. On 19 January, 
Eisenhower endorsed the Bay of Pigs operation to President-elect Kennedy, deeming the 
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cannot let the present government there go on."
139 
The political consequences of a failed 
operation to unseat Castro's government had been deemed less severe than the continued 
existence of that regime. 
In April 1961, Castro prepared Cuban defenses against external invasion, and prepared 
his air force to withstand an enemy strike and be capable of response.
140  
These preparations 
were chronologically coordinated with US operational planning; on 4 April the US decided to 
proceed with the invasion.
141 
Air strikes against the Cuban air force were executed on 15 April, 
and that same day the Cuban Foreign Minister accused the US of executing the bombing as "the 
prologue to a large scale invasion, planned, organized, provisioned, armed, and financed by the 
government of the United States."
142 
The US denied that it had any role in the events, but the  
next day Kennedy formally approved the landing plan for the invasion force.
143 
However, that 
evening Kennedy cancelled the air cover for the invasion force, leaving it unprotected from 
Cuban air force operations.
144 
The landing of the invasion force occurred on 17 April and 
sustained heavy casualties from the Cuban military; at the UN the Soviet delegate read a 
document calling for a cessation of anti-Cuban operations.
145 
Kennedy's response is a claim that 
the US has the right "to protect the hemisphere from external aggression,"
146 
a claim not 
supported by international law but consistent with the exercise of the Monroe Doctrine. On the 
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the end of the day, CIA Director Allen Dulles admitted that "the Cuban invasion is a total 
failure."
148 
On 5 May, the US National Security Council declared that "U.S. policy toward Cuba 
should aim at the downfall of Castro."
149 
Covert operations rather than poorly concealed military 
imperialism were chosen to overthrow Castro. 
Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, President Kennedy changed US policy 
to one of reduced public attention to Cuba (to deny the Cuban government the opportunity to  
play victim); increased economic activity and sabotage of the Cuban economy; increased  
military pressure (e.g., nearby naval exercises); accelerated covert operations; and the spread of 
anti-Cuban propaganda.
150 
The chosen alternative to proxy invasion was a large scale covert 
action program to overthrow Castro, termed Operation Mongoose, initiated on 4 November 
1961.
151 
According to US Attorney General Robert Kennedy, "a solution to the Cuban problem 
today carries the top priority in the United States Government - all else is secondary - no time, 
money, effort, or manpower is to be spared."
152 
By February 1962, US operational plan "aims for 
a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962.
153
At this time, the US Department of 
Defense analyzed the idea that "the USSR could establish ground, sea, or air bases in Cuba and 
that it also delivered missiles with nuclear warheads."
154 
It was considered likely that as time 
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A Soviet military presence in Cuba would deter the US from further aggressions, for fear 
of starting an open war between the US and USSR. For example, if the proposed introduction of 
corrosive materials with the purpose of causing hardware failure
156 
were to occur to a Soviet 
craft in such circumstances that the placement of the material was identifiable as the result of US 
action, the Soviet response could trigger an escalating chain of events that would lead to war. 
Further, if the USSR were successfully to install operational, strategically relevant nuclear 
systems in Cuba, any attack on Cuba or those missile systems would be an attack against the 
Soviet nuclear deterrent. This would carry the same strategic significance as a Soviet strike 
against Turkey. Regardless of whether the strike was targeted at the missiles it would be a strike 
against enemy strategic systems. 
MAD is the main reason why the Cold War did not degenerate into an active conflict. 
 
Each side believed that it could detect an enemy nuclear launch in time to launch its own 
weapons in response, and therefore a first strike would invite a reprisal strike against one's own 
cities. Unless it was possible to destroy all enemy weapons with a surprise first strike, in 1962 
there was no reason to launch a first strike absent international tension. If the USSR attacked 
Turkey or the US attacked Cuba (assuming Cuba harbored strategically significant Soviet 
nuclear systems), such a strike against one portion of the enemy nuclear deterrent would leave 
the bulk of enemy nuclear hardware untouched. This would have created the aforementioned 
international tension, and might have led to nuclear war. 
The US had an established record of covert and overt hostility to Castro's government in 
Cuba. Cuban intelligence had penetrated many of these operations, and Castro was well aware of 









deter the US from continued action was the USSR. Rather than force Castro to co-operate with 
US wishes the US pressure instead encouraged him to cultivate an alliance with the USSR. 
However, Soviet strategic inferiority limited the power of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. 
Cuban/US relations encompassed several models: regional power vs. client; mother  
nation vs. protectorate; and enemy vs. enemy. From the 1823 imposition of the Monroe Doctrine, 
the US desire for political authority over Cuba was clearly expressed even as Cuba was expressly 
permitted to remain a Spanish possession. After the Spanish-American War, Cuba was 
incorporated as a protectorate under US authority. That status was maintained until 1933, at 
which point Cuba became a client state but remained under US authority. That status was 
maintained until the end of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and the ascent to power of Fidel 
Castro. Castro would become a Soviet client, which forced the US to incorporate the modern 









The balance of deterrence evolved throughout the Cold War. At the beginning, US and 
Soviet strategists appraised nuclear war differently. Both nations attached political significance 
to strategic nuclear systems (e.g., ballistic missiles, aircraft), but not to tactical systems designed 
for battlefield use. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the balance of nuclear deterrence 
between the US and USSR before the deployment of Operation Anadyr. 




satellite was not restricted by national boundaries and could provide images of military hardware 
as it was deployed in launch facilities in the US. The first experimental US reconnaissance 
satellite was launched in 1959, with successor operational systems to follow during the 1960s.
2 
However, the US had access to another reconnaissance system without a Soviet equivalent in the 
U-2 aircraft. The U-2 was designed to fly at altitudes of 70,000 feet and provide a stable base for 
camera equipment,
3 
in order to fly over Soviet missile sites and air bases to provide intelligence 
about Soviet military capabilities, while avoiding interception or destruction by Soviet air 
defense forces. 
To facilitate the environment of deterrence, on 21 July 1955 President Eisenhower 
proposed an Open Skies initiative to the USSR under which both nations would be permitted to 
fly over the enemy nation and inspect nuclear launch sites in order to defuse the possibility of a 
surprise nuclear first strike by either power.
4 
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the US to develop an aerial reconnaissance strategy.
5 
The first U-2 flight over the USSR, in 
violation of international law, was launched on 4 July 1956 to inspect Soviet bomber bases; the 
Soviet air force was not capable of intercepting the U-2 due to the aircraft's high-altitude 
capability: 
The Russians attempted more than twenty interceptions of the U-2. MiG [Soviet aircraft 
manufacturer Mikoyan-Gurevich] fighters were photographed desperately trying to reach 





After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, U-2 missions were focused on ICBM production and 
deployment sites, as well as nuclear industrial sites.
7 
The USSR was aware of these flights, but 
had no recourse because Soviet aircraft were incapable of intercepting the U-2. Soviet Surface to 
Air Missile (SAM) development provided the answer; in 1959 the SA-2, which was capable of 
destroying a U-2, was in the process of deployment around strategic nuclear sites.
8 
On 1 May 
1960, this SAM system was responsible for the interception of US U-2 pilot Francis Gary 
Powers' aircraft,
9 
and in the ensuing scandal Eisenhower insisted that the espionage activities, 
however distasteful, were "a vital necessity in the world as it is today."
10 
By the end of 1960, no 
evidence had been discovered of "a single deployed Soviet ICBM site outside of Plesetsk,"
11
 
leading to the conclusion that the USSR possessed only one ICBM launch facility. The US 
accurately appraised the Soviet nuclear deterrent, and both nations were well aware that the US 
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One of the crucial pre-requisites for a situation where nuclear weapons served as political 
deterrents is knowledge. Before Operation Anadyr, both the USSR and the US possessed 
reconnaissance systems in addition to human espionage activities. Both nations were engaged in 
espionage, with the Soviet effort penetrating the Manhattan Project during World War II and the 
US effort recruiting Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. Penkovskiy provided intelligence on "Soviet 
political intentions and the current condition of Soviet military preparations" between April 1961 
and August 1962.
12 
Because the development of the SA-2 had imposed flight restrictions on the 
U-2 over Soviet nuclear sites, the US did not have a technological solution but Penkovskiy was 
able to provide information about Soviet strategic capabilities. 
The strategic purpose of a deterrence system is to impose a well defined, valuable cost to 
any enemy action. In the context of MAD, the cost of military action against the enemy itself, its 
aircraft, submarines, or equipment stationed in an allied state, or personnel stationed in those 
locations would be a nuclear attack against the population centers of the attacker. In 1962, the 
two anticipated actions of this type were the Soviet action against Turkey and the US action 
against Cuba. Turkey had attempted to protect itself by political alliance with the US and 
harboring of US nuclear systems; Cuba had made a political alliance with the USSR and agreed 
to harbor Soviet nuclear systems, even though they had not all become operational. 
Khrushchev's original concept of nuclear strategy relied upon the assumption that 
minimum deterrence was a valid strategic concept, i.e., a minimal Soviet nuclear force would be 













2500 new Minuteman ICBMs, to compensate for the expected large Soviet strategic arsenal.
13 
If 
the US had a substantial strategic advantage, a counter-force strike against the much smaller 
Soviet nuclear force could prevent a Soviet nuclear response and enable a successful first strike. 
MAD requires that all sides possessed a substantial nuclear arsenal, so that a successful counter- 
force strike would be impossible. Deterrence formed the basis for a balance of power between 
the two superpowers; any military action would be answered by a full nuclear response resulting 
in the destruction of both nations. 
The US strategic nuclear forces formed a tripod: aircraft, submarines, and ballistic 
missiles. For the USSR, the dominant force was ballistic missiles, with minimal reliance upon 
aircraft or Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) systems. In 1955, the Soviet navy 
began testing a submarine outfitted with an experimental missile launching system. The missile 
chosen for this purpose, the R-11FM, was fueled by corrosive hypergolic (i.e., ignition on 
contact) liquids and loaded into the submarine already fueled; the nitric acid used as an oxidizer 




had primitive guidance systems, and were regarded by Soviet officers as suitable for training 
crews and not as a capable military force.
15 
The Soviet military valued these missiles for training 
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In December 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev announced the formation of a new 
military branch, the Strategic Rocket Forces,
16 
whose responsibility was strategic missile 
weaponry for the Soviet nuclear deterrent force. This branch was accorded the highest priority 
for allocations of both material and manpower, reflecting Khrushchev's conviction that missile 
weaponry was the way of the future.
17 
However, the structure of Soviet defense industries and 




The most advanced Soviet ICBM at this point was Soviet ballistic missile designer 
Mikhail Yangel's R-16, which experienced a severe accident at the first test of the finished 
missile. On the morning of 23 October 1960 the test missile was fueled with hypergolic liquids, 
but before the launch problems were discovered with the fuel piping for the first stage engine.
19 
The missile technicians worked overnight without removing the fuel and oxidizer from the 
missile, and the next morning a fuel leak was discovered and the launch was rescheduled for 24 
October at 7:15 pm.
20 
By this time, the launch pad was crowded with personnel not limited to 
those required for the test, including Yangel, military personnel, and many of the design 
assistants.
21 
Just after 6:45 pm, a test connection malfunctioned and sent the ignition signal to the 
second stage engine, resulting in an explosion and the death of most of Yangel's designers.
22 
The 
first successful test flight of the R-16 did not occur until 2 February 1961.
23 
This accident, called 
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a monumental setback to the Soviet ICBM program because the competing ICBM design, Sergei 
Korolev's R-9, was not an equivalent strategic system.
24 
Due to the delays, fewer than two dozen 
R-16 missiles were operational in 1962, and Korolev's R-9 was not deployed until 1963.
25 
A 
limited number of R-16 systems comprised the ICBM portion of the Soviet strategic deterrent. 
While the R-16 was an operational ICBM, it was not based in a facility that would allow 
it to survive a US nuclear first strike.
26 
The shelters were designed to resist nearby detonation of 
nuclear warheads
27 
and were not capable of resisting either a direct hit from an enemy missile or 
an airstrike. The US Gaither Commission of 1957 concluded that the only way to shield strategic 
missiles from enemy nuclear action was inside an underground silo that could protect them from 
enemy weapons.
28 
Silo basing would remove the time requirement of erecting the missile on the 
launch pad, conceal fueling preparations from enemy surveillance, and protect the missile from 
enemy attack. The Soviets had no analogous initiative, so those strategies had not been adopted 
by the USSR. The US adopted this basing strategy beginning with the Minuteman I of 1962.
29 
For Soviet ICBMs, Khrushchev allowed that the planned surface basing arrangements would 
suffice for initial deployment, but that silo basing was foreseen in the near future.
30 
Multiple 
strategic implications for Soviet strategic forces were that: the missiles would be much more 
vulnerable to enemy attack; missile fueling or launch preparations could not be concealed; and 
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Technology was another area in which the USSR was at a disadvantage to the US. In the 
event of an R-16 launch, the missile had to be moved to the launch pad, erected, and fueled in a 
process taking between one and three hours.
31 
Aside from the basing arrangement failing to 
protect the missile against an enemy attack, the ability of these missiles to survive an enemy first 
strike provided a reasonable chance of exacting a counter-value (i.e., targeting enemy population 
centers) strike. Targeting equipment provided another advantage to the US: US navigation 
systems were capable of running constantly while the missile was prepared for launch, but Soviet 
systems required as long as 20 minutes to prepare their navigational systems.
32 
The recognized 
disadvantage of Soviet military systems was one reason for the less effective nature of Soviet 
forces as a political deterrent. 
As of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet nuclear forces had neither the 
number of weapons required to destroy US missiles in a first strike nor the required intelligence 
for targeting.
33 
Further, Khrushchev believed the strategic role of nuclear weaponry was to deter 
an enemy attack rather than to initiate a counter-force (i.e., targeting enemy strategic weapons) 
strike.
34 
In July and August 1962 the Soviet government cancelled work on the first generation of 
Soviet ICBMs,
35 
saving the resources to accelerate the development of the second generation. 
 
Khrushchev was not in any position to indulge in brinkmanship or to threaten an enemy who had 
overwhelming strategic superiority, but the Soviet military convinced him that Operation Anadyr 
could be executed without US discovery.
36 
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In 1962, the USSR was severely disadvantaged regarding the Cold War balance of 
strategic forces. The USSR was surrounded by enemy allied states, NATO in the European 
theater, China and Japan in the east, and all of the aforementioned nations politically. Speaking 
only of the balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR, the US was armed 
with 78 land ICBMS, 96 SLBMs, and 1505 nuclear capable bombers.
38 
The USSR was armed 
with 56 ICBMs, 0 internationally ranged SLBMs, and 182 bombers.
39 
The Soviet SLBM force 
was weak; the bulk of the submarine force was diesel fueled rather than nuclear,
40 
limiting range 
and patrol length. In 1961, one of the Soviet strategic missile submarines suffered a reactor 
accident, rendering unfeasible the idea of a possible strategic missile patrol offshore of the US in 
the manner practiced by US ballistic missile submarines.
41 
US submarines routinely patrolled the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which decreased the flight time for their SLBMs to strike enemy 
targets and made their detection by Soviet forces less likely. The Soviet strategic forces also 
suffered from a divided focus, because Khrushchev ordered Yangel’s missile bureau to cease 
work on SLBM systems to concentrate on the R-16.
42 
Khrushchev's strategic vision was driven 
by the belief that missiles were the future, so expenditures on strategic aircraft were curtailed in 
favor of missile development.
43 
The US was developing a nuclear force of aircraft, submarines, 
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was subordinating the development of aircraft in favor of missile development. However, 
stationing strategically important military equipment was a public way for a superpower to prove 
the benefit of alliance to a client state, because it demonstrated the value of the client state to the 
superpower's war plans and ensured a steady supply of financial aid to the client state. 




missile programs were a legacy of World War II; the US and USSR both profited from 
knowledge of Nazi German missile research facilities and staff. At a NATO conference in 
December 1959 the US offered to deploy IRBMs to NATO allies.
45 
The British and the US had 
had an agreement regarding IRBMs, at one point discussing joint development of such a 
system;
46 
in March 1957 an agreement was reached to base some IRBM systems in England 
under joint control.
47 
President Eisenhower attached political weight to missile systems, 
completely divorced from their military efficacy.
48 
While the deployment of strategic missile 
systems to Europe would have some deterrent value against Soviet action, the motivating factor 
for the US to offer this deployment was to restore the credibility that the US would stand with 
NATO in the event of a Soviet attack and not abstain because it was not threatened directly.
49 
The Soviet launch of Sputnik into orbit on 4 October 1957 created the impression among NATO 
allies that the Soviet Union held strategic superiority.
50 
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reasons, the Eisenhower administration reversed the planned reduction in defense spending and 
instead increased the pace of the nuclear arms race.
51
 
The problem with the first generation ICBMs was the launching facility required; each 
missile required its own launch facility and these facilities were expensive. The construction 
delay required to create these bases substantially outlasted the time required to produce a missile; 
at one point in 1960, 24 US ICBMs without any available basing were stored rather than 
deployed.
52 
This requirement also afflicted Soviet first generation missiles; as of 1962 the US 
had begun to deploy the solid-fueled second generation Minuteman ICBM
53 
while a comparable 
 
Soviet ICBM did not yet exist. An unsuccessful development program for a Soviet Minuteman 




The IRBMs offered to NATO in the 1957 meeting were intended by US planners to  
fulfill political rather than military objectives; US policymakers did not consider the IRBMs to  
be capable military systems.
55 
NATO nations were noncommittal in response to this offer, with 




These weapons would have to be defended by NATO forces, which would bring money into the 
Turkish economy; Turkish requests for aid in return for hosting weapons would be considered 
from a national security perspective. The US National Security Council in March 1958 approved 
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carefully managed to prevent the USSR from ascribing aggressive motivations to those 
deployments.
57 
This is an interesting concern because the US exhibited aggressive motivations. 
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Eisenhower administration, and President-Elect 
Kennedy all were aware that the US possessed strategic superiority over the USSR and that 
further expansion of US military equipment on Soviet borders could not be construed as anything 
other than aggressive, as was indicated by Khrushchev's protests that "American missiles were 
aimed against us [USSR] in Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany."
58 
Eisenhower 
contemplated how an analogous Soviet effort would look to the US with the analysis, "If Mexico 
or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists, and then began getting arms and missiles from 
them, we would... it would be imperative for us to take positive action, even offensive military 
action."
59 
However, Eisenhower approved the deployment of IRBMs to NATO allies, having 
anticipated the Soviet reaction to these deployments. 
At a summit in June 1961, Khrushchev discussed the analogy between the US support of 
Turkey and the Soviet support of Cuba, citing the precedent set by the US invasion of the Bay of 
Pigs: stating that Turkey and Iran "have U.S. bases and rockets. If the U.S. believes it is free to 
act (as in the Bay of Pigs), then what should the USSR do?"
60 
Kennedy responded "these two 
countries are so weak that they could be no threat to the USSR, no more than Cuba [is] to the 
US."
61 
Yet the US had launched a proxy invasion of Cuba, so this comparison could be 
paralleled by a similar Soviet action against Turkey. The US government did not consider these 
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"less a matter of the Monroe Doctrine than one of elemental national security...not the same as 
missiles in Turkey."
62 
The US bases encircling the USSR were deemed "for the defense of 
freedom" while the Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere was considered an aggressive 
outpost. That strategically equivalent installations should be characterized differently is illogical. 
Just as US-Cuban relations had been declining for some time before 1962, Soviet-Turkish 
relations had evolved in a similar manner. Soviet-Turkish relations had been unfriendly for some 
time; Turkish fears of Soviet invasion had compelled Turkey to insert a clause into a treaty  
signed with France and Great Britain stating that regardless of any existing obligations, Turkey 
would not enter the war against the USSR.
63 
Turkey feared Soviet action because the USSR 
coveted unrestricted passage through the Bosporus strait, which was controlled solely by Turkey. 
In 1945, the US and Great Britain co-operated to block a Soviet demand for the mandate over the 
formerly Italian colony Tripolitania (today, Libya), denying the USSR any military presence in 
the Mediterranean Sea.
64 
In 1946, the Soviet government attempted to negotiate a revised treaty 




too believed that allowing the USSR to assume some responsibility for the Bosporus strait posed 
a danger to Turkish security, and further believed "the introduction of Soviet arms into Turkey 
would result in Greece and the whole Middle East...falling under Soviet control."
66 
The Soviet 
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than increasing Soviet control over the strait, Turkey was encouraged to join NATO and ally 
itself with the US. 
Eisenhower "ascribed little military value to the IRBMs from the outset but offered them 
to NATO mainly with the political objective of alliance cohesion in the nuclear realm" in mind.
67 
Military weaponry was being used to achieve a political objective, regardless of the strategic 
value of the military hardware. With the Polaris missile submarines now entering service, the 
Jupiter missiles were obsolete before the deployment began.
68 
The military purpose of these 
land-based missiles could be better addressed by the submarines, so the only reason for the 
deployment at that point was political. 
In May 1961, President Kennedy received a memo from US Senator Claiborne Pell 
pointing out the hypocrisy of "declaring allied missiles in Turkey acceptable yet Soviet missiles 
near the United States unacceptable."
69 
Kennedy replied that the analogy was not troublesome, 
and "expressed his intention thereafter to emphasize the different purposes of U.S. and Soviet 
overseas bases."
70 
The purpose of a military base depends on whom the military threat is 
directed; to the USSR the US bases would have the same aggressive purpose as Kennedy 
ascribed to the Soviet bases. Khrushchev noted that "the United States had already surrounded 
the Soviet Union with its own bomber bases and missiles."
71 
That US and Soviet bases should be 
differentiated by the nation rather than strategic purpose is illogical. 
If any crisis between nuclear armed opponents is defined as a nuclear crisis regardless of 
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resolution of the conflict.
72 
The nuclear balance in the early 1960s heavily favored the US, so the 
USSR was at a political and military disadvantage. Nuclear brinkmanship became a political 
bargaining strategy; because the US was positioned to win a nuclear confrontation, it was more 
willing to escalate the risk in an attempt to obtain concessions from the USSR. If the original  
plan for Operation Anadyr, the covert installation of strategic systems and their public revelation 
in November 1962, had been successful it would have had a minimal influence on the strategic 
balance but would have publically bolstered Soviet resolve to resist US threats. "Nuclear 
strategists recognize that not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating,"
73 
so an introduction 
of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba would increase the cost of US victory in a nuclear war. 
This increased cost would provide some deterrent value to actions against both the USSR and 
Cuba because "nuclear superiority reduces the expected costs that a country would incur in the 
event of nuclear war;"
74 
the deployment of additional Soviet IRBMs would decrease the margin 
of US nuclear superiority and therefore increase the potential cost of US action. 
The problem of interpretation was exacerbated by the character of the IRBMs installed in 
Turkey by the US. Because these early missiles used cryogenic liquid fuel, they could not be left 
fueled indefinitely. They were stored empty of fuel and so had to be fueled before firing, a time 
lag that would result in their destruction by an enemy first strike in the event of war. Because 
they were sited close to the border, in the event of a US first strike these weapons possibly could 
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could be launched. These weapons did have some value as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on 
Turkey, but the only US military use was as an instrument for a first strike against the USSR. 
The US nuclear deployment to Turkey completed the encirclement of the USSR with 
enemy nuclear weapons. NATO had deployed IRBMs in a number of nations, the US was 
capable of striking the USSR from the north, east, and west depending on the target, and the 
Turkish deployment cemented a threat from the south. The idea that the USSR would not receive 
this deployment as an aggressive act is not credible; the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons 
in a Soviet border state could not be considered a defensive necessity from a military   
perspective. Another important consideration is the orientation of Soviet launch detection 
systems. Before real-time satellite imagery, over-the-horizon radar was one of the main Soviet 
launch detection methods. This required an elaborate transmission array, which was not portable 
and had to be constructed to observe one particular direction. The Turkish missiles had a chance 
of executing a launch against a Soviet target with minimal or no warning, because no such Soviet 
facility had been constructed from which to observe the Soviet border with Turkey. 
With the NATO IRBMs and the US ICBMs, NATO had overwhelming nuclear 
superiority. The Soviet conventional superiority on the border with NATO was irrelevant; in the 
event of an attack NATO war plans would have called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to 
blunt a Soviet advance. The political calculations surrounding the placement of US nuclear 
weapons in Turkey and Western Europe were irrelevant to the strategic threat they posed to the 
USSR; because of the short distance, consequent flight time, and lack of protection enjoyed by 
these systems, these IRBMs had one strategic role: first strike. MAD required that nations have 
equivalent counterforce capability; the capability of the US to eradicate the Soviet nuclear force 





One of the requirements for MAD was that both nations possessed second-strike 
capability, i.e., even after an enemy first strike a nation would be capable of a counter-value  
strike against the aggressor. However, in October 1962 the US possessed overwhelming nuclear 
superiority. This meant that while the US was capable of destroying the Soviet nuclear deterrent, 
the USSR was neither capable of a counter-force first strike nor a counter-value second strike 
because of the manner in which their strategic systems were deployed. The US had deployed 
SLBM systems and nuclear submarines were limited only by the provisions aboard, allowing 
them to hide in international waters. These submarines were capable of a first strike, potentially 
launched from within Soviet waters, against the land based Soviet strategic missiles. US 
submarines were not vulnerable to Soviet strategic missiles, because their location was unknown 
and Soviet ICBM forces were aimed as US land targets. From the Soviet perspective, the US was 
operating under the guidelines of MAD while the USSR was forced to operate under a doctrine 
the US never considered: finite deterrence.
75
 
The US reached the conclusion that "nuclear weapons must be used not for defeating an 
enemy in war but for preventing such a war from happening in the first place."
76 
This 
transformed the primary function of nuclear weaponry from combat to political maneuvering. 
However, the Soviet military viewed nuclear weaponry "simply as significantly more destructive 
arms that fit readily into the canon on conducting and winning a conventional war."
77 
This 
interpretation removes the political significance from a strategic deployment, because the 
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Soviet military interpretation makes Khrushchev's conclusion that nuclear missiles in Cuba 
would enable Cuba to deal an extremely destructive blow to the US in the event of an invasion
78 
significant from the perspective of Soviet institutional politics. 
As of the summer of 1962, the Soviet strategic position was distinctly inferior to the US 
position. Both nations were capable of counter-value strikes; however the US position was 
superior in terms of deliverable weaponry and warning time. The US would have substantially 
more warning time because of the distance required between the launch system and the target, 
whereas US strategic materiel was deployed on Soviet borders and would offer a limited 
response time to Soviet leadership. Elements of the US nuclear deterrent were placed in Europe 
to achieve political objectives, including assurances to NATO that the US would not abandon 
those nations in the event of a Soviet invasion, but the strategic use of those systems was limited 
to a first strike. The military dimension of US IRBM deployments categorized those systems as 
























Ed. Sergei Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 





Chapter 3: Operation Anadyr 
 
 
Operation Anadyr was the Soviet military deployment that prompted the US to 
instigate the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October 1962.
1 
The deployment consisted of ballistic 
missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft, and ground forces. The only strategically significant 
systems were the ballistic missiles, because the presence of tactical nuclear weapons was not 
announced and so did not serve a deterrent function. The purpose of this chapter is to describe 
the military deployment and capabilities of the weapons deployed in Operation Anadyr and their 
significance. 
In May 1962, Khrushchev determined that further US aggression against Cuba, which  
was intended to replace Castro’s government with one more reflective of US interests, was 
probable and could best be forestalled by the deployment of Soviet strategic forces to Cuba.
2
 




in combination with the presence of US strategic forces in Turkey and US public threats directed 
 
at Cuba, led Khrushchev to conclude that “Kennedy intended to use America’s nuclear 
 
advantage to force Moscow to desert our new partner in the Caribbean.”
4 
If successful, this effort 
would establish the reputation of the USSR as an unreliable ally, and set the precedent that the 
US could use superior strategic capability to force the USSR to heed US demands. In light of the 
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disrupt Soviet political objectives and allow both the US and People's Republic of China (PRC) 
to establish their sovereignty in positions formerly occupied by the USSR. 
The US use of strategic weapons to achieve political objectives in Western Europe and 
Turkey provided an example for Khrushchev to follow, and the fact that the US deployed these 
weapons in client states against the USSR set the precedent that this deployment strategy was 
legal and strategically sound. The decision to send strategic forces to Cuba defended the USSR 
as well, because it allowed the USSR to ameliorate somewhat the 17 to 1 ratio of US strategic 
nuclear forces to Soviet strategic nuclear forces.
5 
The addition of strategically relevant missiles 
 
would decrease the margin of US strategic superiority. Thus the operation could achieve both 
political and military objectives: to defend a client state from US aggression and further develop 
the Soviet nuclear deterrent. 
During a visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, Khrushchev decided that because "the United 
States had surrounded the Soviet Union with its military bases and placed its missiles all around 
our country," that a symmetrical action would be to place analogous forces in Cuba.
6 
The 
intention was that the US would experience firsthand the strategic circumstance in which they 
had positioned the USSR; "they had surrounded us with military bases and kept our country 
under the constant threat of possible nuclear attack."
7 
Khrushchev's purpose in deploying nuclear 
arms was to bring Cuba under the Soviet strategic umbrella, under the theory that the potential 
destruction of US cities "would restrain the powers that be in the United States from invading 
Cuba."
8 
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"would have equalized what the West (NATO) likes to call the 'balance of power.'"
9 
This 
deployment would have bolstered the Soviet nuclear deterrent; somewhat addressing the issues 
caused by US strategic superiority. The USSR was not yet positioned to replace the strategic 
doctrine of 'minimum deterrence' (i.e., the idea that a small nuclear force would deter an enemy 
in the same manner as a larger one) with MAD; whereas Operation Anadyr was insufficient to 
independently facilitate that transition, it was considered capable of expanding the Soviet ability 
to deter a US attack on either the USSR or Cuba. 
Operation Anadyr included deployment of 36 IRBMs capable of striking US targets 1400 
miles away from the launch sites in Cuba and 24 MRBMs capable of striking US targets 2800 
miles distant.
10 
The operation involved 51,000 soldiers, their weaponry, and supplies.
11 
The 
deployment also included nuclear armed cruise missiles, a small number of bombers equipped to 
carry nuclear weapons, and tactical rockets because "it was felt that Pliyev's (the Soviet General 
commanding Operation Anadyr) troops on Cuba, so far from reinforcements, might need the 
added battlefield strength that such tactical atomic arms could provide."
12 
Tactical nuclear 
weapons would not be strategically useful; tactical deployment systems did not have the range or 
a warhead powerful enough for a counterforce mission; their utility was limited solely to 
battlefield use against an enemy invasion force. 
One risk factor, unknown to the US, was the set of instructions given to General Pliyev 
regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons: "If there is no way to communicate with Moscow, 
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if troops actually land on the coast."
13 
Independent nuclear launch authority was an extremely 
unusual event, even with the limit to tactical weaponry. Nuclear launch authority was held only 
by the heads of state, the Soviet leader’s express delegation of such authority to a field 
commander was unprecedented. Had the delegation of independent launch authority been made 
public, it is unlikely that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have been sanctioned by 
Moscow because of the overwhelming US superiority of strategic weapons. The use of these 
weapons in a limited engagement could have escalated into a nuclear total war, for which the 
USSR was not well prepared. 
Operation Anadyr was launched with many concealment measures because announcing 
the presence of strategic missiles would be futile unless they were operational. Even the ship's 
captains did not know the intended destination before departure: 
Before casting off, the troop commander and the ship captain would jointly receive a 
large sealed envelope tied with brown ribbon. Unfastening it, they would find a smaller 
envelope to be opened only at such-and-such coordinates in the Atlantic Ocean. For that 
revealing ceremony, an officer of the KGB's Special Department would join them. The 




The ships were loaded in a deceptive fashion: "combat and specialized military 
equipment was stored below, out of sight; ordinary automobiles, trucks, tractors and harvesters 
were put on the top deck to make it seem that only agricultural gear was being transported."
15 
However the camouflage efforts deemed logical and sufficient in Moscow, decided on the basis 
of maps and with no knowledge of the local terrain, were inadequate: 
Cuba's forests would provide just the needed cover for our missiles. Only someone with 
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A missile-launching complex is not easily disguised. The area is filled not with slim, 
upright rockets but with multiple command and support buildings, rows of fuel trucks and 
hundreds of meters of thick cable - all surrounding the large concrete slabs that anchored 
the missile launchers. Once the heavy equipment had been moved in, such an installation 
- but not the roads built to it - could be hidden from ground-level view. From above, 




The operational design for Anadyr assumed that the strategic systems could be 
constructed in a way concealed from enemy intelligence until they had become operational. The 
camouflage measures taken with regard to the soldiers and equipment while in transport provide 
a stark contrast to the measures taken to disguise the deployment in Cuba. Because of the 
geography, even if the Soviet SAM deployments deterred flights over Cuba by the U-2, this 
aircraft was able to fly outside of Cuban territory and still obtain pictures of Soviet launch 
facilities. If the launch facilities could not be concealed from hostile surveillance, the measures 
taken in transporting the men and equipment to Cuba were irrelevant because their presence 
easily could be discovered once they arrived. 
The 24 MRBMs would not have provided the USSR with a viable counter-force weapon; 
even though they had sufficient range to strike targets in the continental US, they were 
insufficient in number and not deployed in a hardened manner (e.g., in a structure that would 
protect them from enemy assault, either conventional or nuclear). However, MRBMs would 
provide a counter-value deterrent, which would force the US to consider whether the prospect of 
conquering Cuba was worth the nuclear destruction of US cities. Launching such weapons 90 
miles away from the continental US would provide minimal time for warning, and the US did  











aware of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles, it was straightforward and easy to deploy a 
system to monitor for a launch from Cuba. 
The MRBMs deployed to Cuba had the range to strike targets anywhere in the continental 
US. However, there were far more strategic targets than deployed missiles. In 1962, the US 
possessed 78 ICBMs and 96 SLBMs.
17 
The 24 missiles deployed would be insufficient to launch 




Because the Soviet MRBMs were deployed in Cuba without any protection from enemy attack, 
they had no value as instruments of reprisal in the event of a US attack on the Soviet mainland. 
These weapons were not strategically useful except as part of a Soviet first strike, but they were 
ill suited for that role because of the time required to ready them for launch and the limited time 
they could remain fueled. The MRBMs were politically useful as a symbol of Soviet support for 
Cuba and strategically useful to deter a US attack on Cuba. The US would not strike at a Soviet 
strategic base for fear of initiating an open nuclear war. 
The 36 IRBMs would not have provided the USSR with a counter-force weapon either. 
The insufficient numbers and imprecise targeting made them incapable of destroying silo based 
weapons like the US solid-fueled Minuteman that had begun to enter service. These forces 
provided a similar counter-value capability to the MRBMs, and the combined purpose would be 
to deter nuclear war. The Soviet government informed General Anatoli Gribkov of the purpose  
of the deployment; "you know very well that we are stationing the missiles in Cuba in order to 
deter possible aggression of the United States of America and its allies."
19 
The combination force 
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superiority; however it would reduce the magnitude of the US strategic advantage. Operation 
Anadyr would reinforce the Soviet nuclear deterrent but not in a manner capable of surviving a 
US first strike. 
The deployed IRBMs were of more limited strategic use than the MRBMs. They 
possessed the same strategic limitations as the MRBM systems, with the additional range 
constraint. The IRBMs were less capable of either a counter-force or counter-value strike, 
because their range limited the target selection of either US population centers or military 
facilities. This constraint limited their utility for a first strike, which was the purpose the US 
ascribed to the deployment. This assumption caused the US to doubt Foreign Minister  
Gromyko's desire "to emphasize that the Soviet Union would never become involved in the 
furnishing of offensive weapons to Cuba."
20 
The strategic function of the Soviet ballistic missiles 
 
deployed to Cuba was not that of a first strike, and many of the missiles deployed would have 
been of limited use in such a mission. 
Operation Anadyr included aircraft as well as strategic missiles. The Soviet philosophy of 
strategic warfare is evident in this deployment; the 17 IL-28 bombers included only 6 equipped  
to carry nuclear weapons.
21 
Also included were helicopters, two antiaircraft divisions, and 11 
aircraft intended for noncombat missions.
22 
Strategically, none of these was relevant; even a 
 
nuclear armed force of six bombers would not have any effect upon the strategic balance and 
would be destroyed by US air defenses before they could accomplish any mission. According to 
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long before and were gradually removing them from our arsenal."
23 
If the US invaded Cuba, the 
US would do so with air support that easily could destroy these bombers. The IL-28s would be 
tactically useful against a landing force; their deployment was intended for coastal defense.
24
 
In 1962, the USSR was capable of fielding 182 bombers of intercontinental range.
25 
This 
force was strategically inferior to 1505 US bombers with intercontinental range,
26 
and against 
such numbers the six bombers deployed to Cuba were irrelevant. It is curious why the nuclear- 
capable IL-28 models were deployed; they were not intended to accomplish any strategic or 
deterrence objective and were tactically inferior to the other deployed systems for coastal 
defense. The USSR "did not see much defensive advantage to be gained by announcing that such 
arms [the IL-28s] were part of our arsenal on Cuba."
27 
Without public announcement or US 
intelligence information, the US did not learn of the existence of these weapons and therefore 
they could not deter US action. 
The 80 nuclear armed cruise missiles would be limited to use against forces landing on 
Cuba or offshore naval support of such a landing. These coastal defense missiles were designed 
to be launched from land deployments against naval targets, and so were optimized for use 
against a hostile invasion fleet.
28 
They were nuclear armed, but possessed tactical warheads 
suitable for battlefield use rather than strategic warheads intended for use against hardened 
targets or cities. In combination with their limited range, the cruise missiles could not serve 
either counter-force or counter-value functions; the intended purpose of these weapons was 
purely defensive in a tactical sense. 
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The deployment of Luna rockets armed with tactical nuclear weapons also was a 
defensive maneuver. These rockets had limited effective range, and like the cruise missiles were 
limited to use for tactical objectives. They could not serve as strategic weapons in any capacity; 
the independent launch authority given to Pliyev in the event of lost contact with Moscow was 
destabilizing rather than a force for deterrence because this detail was not announced to US 
political or military leadership. However given that the strategic missile deployments had not 
become operational at the time of their discovery by the US, the use of tactical nuclear weaponry 
could have escalated into a nuclear total war for which the USSR was not well prepared. 
In the US-organized Bay of Pigs landing, the naval targets observed by the Cuban Air 
Force consisted of "seven or eight large boats and an indeterminate number of launches and 
landing craft."
29 
These craft were engaged in the deployment of the Cuban exile landing force, 
and contained stores of ammunition and fuel.
30 
Had a similar landing been executed by US 
 
forces once the tactical nuclear systems were operational, the landing force easily could have 
been destroyed with minimal Cuban or Soviet losses. If the US had deployed aircraft carriers or 
other surface vessels, in the event of hostilities these too could be destroyed easily. However the 
use of these missiles could escalate the conflict from a limited proxy engagement to a limited 
nuclear war, and potentially a nuclear total war, so the tactical nuclear missiles were much more 
suited to an exercise of political power than actual use. 
Soviet first use of tactical nuclear weapons would escalate the conflict to a limited 
nuclear war, even if that use were defensive in nature. Even if the strategic inventory of 
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was in a position to threaten a counter-force strike and escalate the conflict, because the USSR 
could not threaten a counter-force strike or risk escalation to the nuclear level for fear of 
inevitable defeat. US strategic superiority executed a deterrent function upon Soviet action 
because the USSR was restrained in a way the US was not, as demonstrated by the Soviet 
abstention from covert operations against Turkish or NATO targets and the continued US covert 
action against Soviet client state Cuba. 
The Soviet deployment of strategic weaponry to Cuba was viewed as equivalent to the 
US placement of strategic weaponry in Turkey by Khrushchev.
31 
Khrushchev knew that 
"American missiles were aimed against us (USSR) in Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West 
Germany."
32 
The USSR did not make their deployment public, but the US did not "warn us 
(USSR) that they (US) were going to place missiles in Turkey or that they had missiles already 
in Italy and other NATO countries,"
33 
so this strategy is not without precedent. Publically 
warning an enemy that one nation was placing strategically significant weaponry in a border 
nation would have expanded that nation's nuclear umbrella to protect the client state. It would 
also warn the enemy nation that a potential first strike platform had been deployed; such 
warnings were necessary for the missiles to fulfill any deterrent function. The Soviet deployment 
was nothing the US deployments to NATO had not been, in the words of Khrushchev "we 
merely made use of the same methods our opponents used toward us."
34 
The US deployment to 
Turkey and the Soviet deployment to Cuba were both intended to politically support a client 
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1961, the USSR had been supplying Cuba with military hardware and ammunition,
35 
so 
Operation Anadyr was executed within an existing legal framework. 
The Jupiter missiles deployed to Turkey were subject to different strategic controls than 
were the Soviet missiles deployed to Cuba. The Soviet missiles were entirely under Soviet 
command,
36 
with the warheads controlled by the KGB and the missiles controlled by the  
military. However, in NATO deployments the US would have custody of the nuclear warheads 
but the host nation (in this case Turkey) would have launch authority over the missiles 
independent from the US.
37 
This introduced an element of instability because this launch 
arrangement was only practical in the event of a US launched first strike. In the event of a Soviet 
first strike, even if these missiles survived, the circumstances required for a launch demanded 
orders from both US and Turkish authorities and such communication would likely not be  
reliable in case of a nuclear war. 
The US deployment to Turkey was executed in the aftermath of the 1957 Soviet launch  
of Sputnik I, which demonstrated both the status of Soviet technological development and ICBM 
capability.
38 
The launch highlighted NATO dependence on US nuclear weapons, and threatened 
the idea that NATO was incorporated under the US nuclear umbrella.
39 
The US sought to 
 
establish its strategic credibility by basing strategic weapons in NATO nations, so that if NATO 
were attacked the US would be both able and compelled to react. The weapons were intended to 
solve a political problem; "As taken as U.S. policymakers were with the political and 
psychological value of the missiles, the documents clearly suggest that they were unimpressed 
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with their military utility."
40 
These missiles were not intended for a first strike against the USSR, 
even though their deployment in sites with no protection from enemy attack and their liquid fuel 
rendered them incapable of surviving a Soviet strike (whether conventional or nuclear) and 
therefore their strategic utility was limited to a first strike. The missiles were intended to 
reinforce the NATO deterrent and cement political unity rather than serve any military function. 
The Soviet missiles in Cuba similarly were intended to deter US attack, not constitute 
part of any Soviet offensive planning. Khrushchev intended "to establish a tangible and effective 
deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean" by the deployment of missiles in the same 
manner that the US had deployed around the USSR.
41 
The difference with the US deployment to 
Turkey lies in the relative strategic significance of the deployment: the US missiles deployed to 
Turkey were not a substantial portion of the US strategic arsenal, but the 60 missiles deployed to 
Cuba were roughly one fifth of available Soviet strategic systems. Strategic forces deployed to 
Turkey were much less relevant to the balance of deterrence for the US than were the Soviet 
weapons deployed to Cuba by the USSR. 
Cuba had been developing a military deterrent force, albeit non-nuclear, so that "in the 
event of a direct U.S. military attack, [Cuban forces] would be able to put up stiff resistance and 
cost the enemy a high price in lives - a price that the U.S. politicians and strategists would not be 
ready to pay."
42 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko published an article stating that 
Khrushchev privately expressed the sentiment to him that "in order to preserve Cuba as an 
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While a Cuban conventional assault could make a US attack costly, it could not deter a 
sufficiently motivated US leader; a Soviet nuclear presence could deter an attack altogether by 
raising the cost of a US attack to civilian population centers rather than military casualties. 
The deterrent capability of Cuban conventional forces to US hostile action was not a 
factor in US decision-making. The US was currently engaged in covert operations to replace 
Castro's government, in such a manner that the efforts could be denied and therefore not require 
the public use of the US military. Because the operations would not require the use of uniformed 
US forces, the Cuban conventional forces posed an increasing obstacle to operational success but 
did not deter operational planning. According to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the military 
option discussed involved "five hundred sorties, striking all military targets, including the missile 
sites, airfields, ports, and gun emplacements."
44 
An operation of this scale not deterred by the 
 
Soviet surface to air missile (SAM) capability would not be deterred by the Cuban military 
either. 
Just before the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko emphasized the defensive nature of the weapons deployed to Cuba; "he (Gromyko) 
wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union would never become involved in the furnishing of 
offensive weapons to Cuba."
45 
While the strategic value of the missiles limited them to a Soviet 
first strike on the US, Khrushchev's "principal aim was only to deter America from starting a 
war."
46 
The presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons likely would have filled a deterrent 
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Khrushchev's speeches lent themselves well to the assessment of the USSR as holding a 
superior strategic position to the US, and therefore his bellicose rhetoric conveyed the impression 
that he was willing to start a nuclear war. The Soviet announcement that tactical nuclear weapons 
were operational and had been deployed as a fundamental part of Operation Anadyr definitely 
would have influenced US decision-making. The US faction supporting an attack on the strategic 
missile sites before they could become operational would have been faced with a choice: to 
expand the target list to include those sites or to be deterred by the presence of Soviet tactical 
nuclear weapons. The blockade eventually announced, in violation of international law, would  
not have prevented the deployment of these weapons. 
In summary, the equipment of Operation Anadyr does not support the US analysis of an 
aggressively intended operation. The only strategically significant weapons deployed were 60 
ballistic missiles, a force insufficient to execute a counter-force mission and based in a way that 
prevented survival of a US strike to exact a counter-value second strike. The aircraft, tactical 
nuclear weapons, and conventional forces deployed were not strategically significant because of 
the low number and obsolescent design of aircraft, the range restriction of tactical nuclear 
delivery systems, and the defensive nature of the conventional deployment. The objective of the 
operation was to deter US operations against Soviet allied Cuba, for which the strategic nuclear 
weapons were essential; the tactical nuclear weapons and conventional arms were deployed to 










Operation Anadyr was characterized by the US as an 'aggressive expansion of Soviet 
power.' Although the deployment of nuclear weaponry to a Soviet ally was unprecedented, it 
could be considered a defensive deployment in both military and political contexts. Militarily, 
Operation Anadyr was a defense of an ally as well as a reinforcement of the Soviet nuclear 
deterrent. Politically Operation Anadyr expressed Soviet protection of Cuba and Cuban inclusion 
under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the military and 
political significance of Operation Anadyr. 
General deterrence (e.g., MAD) takes advantage of the balance of strategic forces to 
shape an enemy's decisions over an extended time period, whereas immediate deterrence is a 
measure to prevent a specific enemy action or reaction.
1 
Operation Anadyr was an example of 
both general and immediate deterrence: General because it reinforced the Soviet strategic 
deterrent and therefore the balance of MAD and immediate because it aimed to deter further 
attacks on Cuba (e.g. US Operation Mongoose). Both general and immediate deterrence by the 
USSR ran counter to US interests: the US enjoyed strategic superiority over the USSR and did 
not want the USSR to attain nuclear parity. Furthermore, Operation Anadyr challenged the US 
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Operation Anadyr did not appreciably alter the strategic balance between the US and 
USSR. The Soviet deployed cruise missiles, Luna rockets, and 6 nuclear capable bombers were 
useful tactically but had no strategic significance. The IRBM and MRBM systems deployed were 









with any counter-force capability. Their strategic utility was limited to a defense of Cuba through 
immediate deterrence, as they were not deployed in hardened launch sites and were not capable  
of surviving a US first strike to launch a counter-value response. In 1962, the US held 
overwhelming strategic superiority and was therefore positioned to exercise general deterrence to 
prevent the USSR from deploying missiles in non-Soviet nations that might alter the strategic 
balance in the direction of parity. 
Finite deterrence, the belief that even a minimal nuclear arsenal would deter an enemy, 
would prompt both factions to consider whether a given tactical objective was worth the price 
exacted by a small nuclear arsenal; however with tactical nuclear weapons it was difficult to 
differentiate between deterrence and military value.
2 
Tactical weapons are intended to achieve 
tactical military objectives (e.g., destroying a land army or naval detachment) and therefore have 
little strategic significance; an exception is when an enemy is forewarned of these systems and 
therefore a deployment that could provoke their use would risk escalating to a limited nuclear 
war. The Luna rockets and cruise missiles deployed to Cuba would likely have exercised an 
immediate deterrence function against a US attack had the US been aware of their presence. 
As part of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US demanded that the USSR 
withdraw any weapon systems that could have an offensive capability, "a vague formulation that 
could imply any kind of weapon that the United States asserted to be for that purpose."
3 
This 
definition allowed the US to demand that any weapon systems it did not want the Cuban 
government to access be withdrawn by the USSR, as it would eventually demand in the case of 
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intended for aggressive purposes, so this demand must have been based upon other 
considerations. The IL-28 was no longer being produced by the USSR and was in the process of 
phasing out of active service in the Soviet air force. However, Khrushchev "thought that in 
Cuban conditions, for purely defensive purposes, they could play a role."
4 
Their intended 
purpose was coastal defense,
5 
to augment by conventional arms the defensive capability of the 
 
nuclear armed Luna rockets and cruise missile systems, which may have been the reason for the 
withdrawal demand in light of the plans for Operation Mongoose. 
The US had continued to plan hostile operations against Cuba and Castro's government 
after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Bay of Pigs invasion had utilized a force of 
Cuban exiles equipped and trained by the CIA, and had failed to overthrow Castro because the 
Cuban people did not rise up in revolution as had been expected by the operational planners. 
Before President Kennedy publicly announced the US would cease hostile operations against 
Cuba, the planners of Operation Mongoose would not have wanted the Cuban government to 
gain additional defensive materiel because it would make operational planning more difficult. 
Operation Anadyr successfully achieved one of its objectives, to protect Cuba from continued 
US action. 
Operation Anadyr was less successful regarding the other objective of compensating for 
Soviet strategic inferiority. The deployment to Cuba was withdrawn, so no additional nuclear 
capability was added to the Soviet arsenal. However, part of the resolution process was the 
withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey provided the USSR did not make that provision public. 
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Operation Anadyr did achieve the goal of defending the USSR. The US removal of the Jupiter 
IRBMs from Turkey also reveals US acknowledgement of the equality of the two deployments; 
both used strategically significant materiel to achieve political and military goals. When the US 
deployed Jupiter missiles to Turkey, Kennedy disarmament advisor John McCloy answered 
Foreign Minister Gromyko's complaints with the claim that the weapons were intended for 
defensive purposes only.
6 
The deployment of similar materiel for similar purposes should be 
interpreted similarly, regardless of the nationality of the materiel involved. That the crisis was 
resolved with concessions from both the US and Soviet Union challenges the characterization of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis as an unqualified US victory; the US had to acknowledge the analogous 
relationship between the US missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba. 
The manner in which the US missiles in Turkey were deployed and the Soviet missiles 
deployed in Cuba had strategic consequences. Both deployments were situated in unprotected 
sites that offered no protection to the missiles to survive an enemy first strike. This limited the 
military utility of these missiles to launching a first strike. Further reinforcing that strategic 
demand was the fact that the host nations were situated in such a way that an enemy nuclear 
attack would not come from the expected direction, allowing the launching nation to achieve 
tactical surprise. Expected missile approaches were from the east, west, and north, but at this 
point not the south; deterrents in the form of missile submarines had not developed. The US 
missiles required cryogenic fuel, which limited both the amount of time they could retain fuel 
and the strategic readiness. The Soviet missiles were fueled by hypergolic liquids, which 
similarly limited the time they could retain fuel and the time delay fueling required. Because 









not be sufficient warning of enemy attack to fuel and launch the weapons of either deployment. 
These weapons were useless as a counter-value deterrent because they would not survive any 
enemy first strike, whether from conventional or nuclear weapons. 
Although Operation Anadyr did not fundamentally change any military fact, it did 
challenge the US established political order. The US had long promulgated the Monroe Doctrine, 
which forbade the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union. This position directly 
contradicted the founding charters of two political institutions whose formation the US had 
assisted, the OAS and the UN. Under the terms of the UN Charter: "All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state."
7 
This tenet directly forbade US interference in Cuban 
political affairs. The OAS Charter offered additional protections: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle 
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat 





The US record of economic warfare, political isolation, and covert activity flagrantly violated 
these terms. The US behaved aggressively toward Cuba, attempting to coerce Cuba to return to 
the status of US client. The Cuban alliance with the USSR involved an ally with deterrent power 
in US-Cuban affairs. 
Operation Anadyr could be considered a Soviet pyrrhic victory. At the cost of a near 
outbreak of nuclear war in addition to the financial and political costs associated with 
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missiles from Turkey and a non-invasion pledge. Those US concessions resulted in the 
achievement of the original objectives: protecting Cuba from further US aggression and a 
reduction in the US strategic nuclear advantage. Although this reduction came as the result of a 
reduction to the US arsenal rather than addition to the Soviet one, the goal of removing a US 
force not strategically capable of a reprisal strike and therefore only useful in an aggressive role 
contributed to the balance of stability. The US goal of removal of strategic missiles was 
accomplished, but at the cost of canceling US efforts to overthrow Castro's government and 
returning Cuba to the status of US client. Before US discovery of Operation Anadyr, the US goal 
was the overthrow and replacement of Castro's government. In the resolution the US forfeited the 
opportunity to achieve that goal without unilateral abrogation of a public promise, which would 
destroy American credibility. 
Operation Anadyr had additional political significance for both the US and USSR  
because the US publicly and repeatedly threatened: "the U.S. would not tolerate the introduction 
of offensive surface-to-surface missiles, or offensive weapons of any kind, into Cuba."
9 
With this 
statement the US attempted to preserve a strategic asymmetry that strategically favored the US 
and enforced general deterrence on the USSR. Politically, this demand would have divorced  
Cuba from the Soviet strategic umbrella because the Soviet Union would be forced to decide if 
the alliance with Cuba was worth a substantial risk of nuclear war. This was the same scenario in 
which the US and NATO found themselves, and was a motivating factor for the US deployment 
to Turkey. The solution the US settled upon was to encompass NATO in the US nuclear 
umbrella by deploying strategic equipment in NATO nations, so that a Soviet attack on any 









US would not decide that the alliance was not worth a nuclear war, and leave the European 
nations to face a Soviet invasion alone. The USSR felt the same pressure regarding its alliance 
with Cuba, and Khrushchev decided that a strategic deployment would achieve political 
objectives with ancillary military benefit. 
Operation Anadyr successfully accomplished the goal of protecting Cuban political 
independence. The US had an extended record of interference in Cuban affairs, dating from the 
Spanish-American War. Fidel Castro's alliance with the Soviet Union introduced a rival ideology 
to the Western Hemisphere, in defiance of the US extension of the Monroe Doctrine to 
ideological as well as political allegiances. That the Cuban alliance with the USSR was a 
response to US political, military, and economic aggression against Cuba was not considered 
relevant to the US extension of the Monroe Doctrine; from the US perspective, the Cuban 
government should once again abide by US imperial edicts as a client state as had the previous 
Cuban government. 
Operation Anadyr developed the Soviet position in the Communist world by protecting a 
client state that was a Soviet affiliate. After the death of Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin 
in 1953 a division emerged between the USSR and PRC governments. After Stalin's death, the 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was the elder Communist leader and 
expected the newly ascendant First Secretary Khrushchev to yield primacy of position in the 
Communist world to Chairman Mao. Both the PRC and the USSR had been supporting 
international Communist parties, attempting to further the ideologies promulgated by each 
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after the Russian Revolution had produced a Communist government capable of spreading 
ideology abroad. After the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC adopted an ideology distinct 
from the Soviet interpretation, and the PRC competed with the USSR to attract foreign 
Communist parties to its interpretation.
11 
No previous attempts had been made to cultivate or 
develop these parties before WWII, and under the Monroe Doctrine ""the most plausible cause of 
this liberty was the overwhelming preponderance of power then exercised in the hemisphere by 
the United States"
12 
However the US no longer wielded unquestioned power over the affairs of 
Central and South American nations, due to increased Soviet power and the international 
organizations (e.g., the OAS; UN) that attempted "independently" to sanction US action. 
Cuban defiance of the Monroe Doctrine by alliance with the USSR provided an example 
where the US was unable successfully to remove an Eastern European allied government in what 
the US had previously considered a zone necessary to its national security. Even one successful 
defiance of a previously exercised doctrine rendered that doctrine of questionable potency. 
Under the tenets of the UN Charter; Article I states that the first purpose of the UN is: "to 
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression;"
13 
Article II states: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members."
14 
The US was a founding member of the UN and holds a seat on the 
 
UN Security Council, so the exercise of a doctrine blatantly contrary to the UN Charter would be 
indefensible. The inclusion of a US non-invasion pledge in the resolution of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis could be interpreted as an abdication of the Monroe Doctrine. 
11 
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US-Soviet relations did not suffer any enduring damage from the events proceeding from 
Operation Anadyr. Precisely because the fear of escalation into nuclear war had been sparked,  
the US and USSR realized that no mechanisms were in place, aside from the evolving deterrence 
framework, to prevent the escalation of a crisis into a nuclear war. The most important 
consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the creation of a direct line of communication 
between the Soviet government's headquarters in the Kremlin and the US President's residence in 
the White House.
15 
Regardless of political tensions, a nuclear total war would result in the 
complete destruction of both nations and so the creation of a hotline for direct communication 
would be required for negotiations to limit any engagement to tactical weaponry and not allow 
escalation to total war. 
The hotline also changed the strategic significance of a nuclear first strike designed to 
eliminate an enemy nation's leader; for such a strike to result in a limited nuclear war instead of a 
full nuclear exchange, communication with the new enemy leadership would be necessary. If the 
missiles of Operation Anadyr were to be used in a first strike, that strike could not be against 
Washington DC because the hotline connection would be destroyed and there would be no direct 
way to contact the new US leadership to negotiate an end to hostilities. 
As an aggressive expansion of Soviet strategic power, Operation Anadyr was a failure. The 
limited ballistic missile force dispatched to Cuba was capable of neither counter-force nor 
counter-value retaliatory strikes because they were not based in hardened facilities. The aircraft 
deployed were limited both in terms of obsolesce and numbers; six nuclear capable aircraft could 
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announced, which would be required for tactical weaponry to exercise a deterrent function. 
Soviet military deployment of both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons was intended to 









From the early years of the US government, incorporation of Cuba into the US Empire in 
some form had been contemplated. Before the Spanish-American War of 1898, Cuba had been 
considered by US politicians as a fundamentally important territory even as it remained as a 
Spanish colony. After US victory, Cuba was acquired as a protectorate that was required to 
submit relations with all foreign powers to US approval. This status was maintained until 
Fulgencio Batista's 1933 revolution installed him as President of Cuba. Batista had no previous 
political experience, and would eventually maintain power through use of military power. In 
1952, Batista led a coup against the democratically elected government and installed himself as 
an authoritarian leader. Batista did not have the support of the Cuban people, and was 
overthrown in a coup by Fidel Castro in December 1958. By this point the CIA had assessed that 
US interests might not be well served by the Castro government,
1 
an analysis that would be 
validated by the events of 1962. 
In 1962 both the US and USSR had access to information about the other superpower's 
strategic deterrent by utilizing satellite imagery. However, the US alone had access to a system 
capable of providing imagery on an abbreviated timeline in the U-2. U-2 flights had provided the 
US with knowledge of the Soviet nuclear deterrent, in addition to the information provided by 
US agent and Soviet Colonel Penkovskiy. The USSR did not have the same level of information; 
the Soviet intelligence sources in the US were not of the same caliber and there was no Soviet 
equivalent of the U-2. As of May 1962, both US and Soviet governments were aware of the true 









USSR was only capable of a limited scope counter-value deterrent. This balance allowed the US 
to deter a range of Soviet actions, while the USSR was limited deterring hostile military activity. 
Operation Anadyr did not involve sufficient materiel to alter the strategic balance. The 
deployment of 60 strategically relevant missiles would bolster the Soviet deterrent, affording the 
USSR an additional measure of political leverage, but would not provide enough additional 
nuclear weapons to enable a counter-force strike. The aircraft, cruise missiles, and Luna rockets 
were not strategically relevant because they did not provide any additional ability to deliver 
weapons on US targets. The cruise missiles and rockets did not have sufficient range to attack all 
but a fraction of US targets, and the 6 nuclear capable aircraft would be intercepted and 
destroyed before they could mount an attack on any target. The tactical use of nuclear weapons, 
even in a defensive capacity, could escalate to a nuclear total war for which the USSR was not 
well positioned; even if the presence of tactical nuclear weapons had been announced to the US, 
those weapons would not have served a deterrent function. The presence of strategic missiles 
was a necessity if the USSR were to successfully deter a US attack on Cuba. 
The US assessment of Operation Anadyr as an aggressive expansion of Soviet power is 
not well supported by the historical record, unless 'aggressive expansion' is defined as a threat to 
US global primacy. The political and military objectives of Operation Anadyr were defensive; 
the objectives were to defend Cuba by deterring US hostile operations and to defend the USSR 
by developing the Soviet strategic deterrent. Further, the materiel comprising the deployment 
was insufficient to alter the strategic balance. However, Operation Anadyr provides a historical 
example of the political uses of strategic weaponry. Study of the political and military 





commanders who contemplate deployment of strategically significant equipment to achieve 
political objectives, with the military function relegated to ancillary importance. 
As stated by US participant Dino Bruggoni, the US view of the Cuban Missile Crisis is 
that it was an effort to threaten a nuclear first strike, escalating the Cold War by deploying 
strategically significant military equipment in an unprecedented fashion with minimal 
geographical separation between the missile bases and the targets. Further, the Soviet 
deployment to Cuba was considered illegal and a threat to the peace in the Western hemisphere. 
However, Operation Anadyr was not illegal or without precedent. 
The US deployment to Turkey had preceded Operation Anadyr. Therefore, Operation 
Anadyr was not an escalation. The Turkish deployment was to a nation that shared a border with 
the USSR, while the Cuban deployment was located 90 miles away from the US. While both 
deployments were intended to solve political rather than military goals, the use of strategically 
significant equipment resulted in a military dimension. 
The idea of defending an ally with the deployment of strategic weaponry remains 
relevant; currently that circumstance occurs in the Republic of China (Taiwan), where US forces 
are deployed to deter an invasion by the PRC. Similar deployments exist in South Korea, Japan, 
and Eastern Europe to deter potential action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), the PRC, and the Russian Federation, respectively. These deployments are an 
example of general deterrence; forces are deployed to increase the cost of an invasion and 
involve an ally rather than to deter any immediate threat. However, these deployments also can 
be characterized as US deployments intended to threaten the developed power with nuclear 





The US Navy regularly patrols the strait between Taiwan and the PRC. A standing patrol 
is not the same level of patronage as a US strategic deployment to a base on Taiwan would be, 
but it still exerts an immediate deterrent effect on the PRC. The US had stationed nuclear 
weapons in Taiwan in 1958,
2 
when the US officially recognized the Taiwanese government and 
was bound by treaty to protect Taiwan against the PRC. However the Taiwanese government 
launched its domestic nuclear weapons program at some point in the interval 1965-1967, because 
Taiwan did not trust the US nuclear umbrella to deter a PRC first strike.
3 
The subsequent US 
effort to force Taiwan to abandon its domestic nuclear program suggests that a superpower client 
state with an independent nuclear deterrent would involve the superpower in the event of an 
outbreak of war. If Taiwan were to use a nuclear weapon against the PRC, the ensuing chain of 
escalation could involve the US in a nuclear crisis even if the US sought to remain removed from 
those events. 
Another current example of a scenario analogous to the Cold War is the situation 
involving Iran and Israel. Iran has been developing a nuclear weapon, and a present international 
agreement prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear state; Israel possesses a developed domestic 
nuclear industry and is widely believed to be a nuclear power, but has refused to declare itself 
either as a nuclear or non-nuclear power. Both nations possess conventional militaries armed 
with advanced weaponry, as well as chemical and possibly biological weapons. Chemical and 
biological weapons possess counter-value capability, and as such are politically useful in the 
same manner as are nuclear weapons. Because of the domestic unrest in Syria and Iranian 
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deployed in territory occupied by those groups in order to exert immediate deterrent value. The 
lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis apply to the Iran-Israel scenario in the same manner as the 
US and USSR in the Cold War. 
The Iran-Israel situation parallels the Cold War in that both nations possess 
unconventional arms, substantial conventional arsenals, and opposing ideologies. Even if Iran 
does not possess a nuclear arsenal, Iran does possess a substantial stock of chemical and 
biological weapons suitable for a counter-value strike. Both nations exert general deterrence 
through un-conventional arms as well as immediate deterrence through conventional arms and 
the force of foreign allies. Both nations have governing ideologies that constrain the action of 
their leaders, although the ideologies are founded on religious rather than political rhetoric. 
The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis is portrayed in US sources as an unqualified 
US victory because the resolution involved the removal of equipment deemed offensive to the 
US. The USSR did not achieve an enduring change to the strategic balance in the sense that the 
missiles reinforcing the Soviet nuclear deterrent were removed. However, the USSR did achieve 
an enduring alteration because the operational Turkish missiles were removed and therefore the 
US nuclear deterrent force was decreased. The Soviet goal of achieving a defensive benefit to the 
USSR was achieved, if not in the manner that Khrushchev intended. The second Soviet goal of 
the operation, the defense of Cuba, was achieved by President Kennedy's non-intervention 
promise. After President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, every subsequent US President has 
treated Kennedy's non-intervention pledge as a political and military commitment. Operation 
Anadyr achieved the intended goals of protecting Cuban political independence and adjusting the 
strategic balance to Soviet benefit, and should therefore be considered a success rather than a 





The US also achieved its Cuban Missile Crisis goal of removing the Soviet strategic 
missiles from Cuba. After the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, no strategically relevant 
Soviet equipment remained in Cuba. Some Soviet conventional forces remained, which would 
have complicated US hostile action such as Operation Mongoose, but were unlikely to deter the 
attempt. However as part of the agreement that led to the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
the non-intervention pledge required the cancellation of Operation Mongoose. Cuban political 
independence would be preserved, which created an exception to the Monroe Doctrine that was 
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